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“Fairness is what justice really is.”
—Potter Stewart (1915–1985), Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the years leading up to the financial crisis of 2008, investment
banks and other large financial institutions used tactics that were
misleading and unfair in structuring, marketing, selling and other-
wise dealing in complex over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives with
names such as “swaps,”2 “collateralized debt obligations,”3 and “credit
1. Search of Quotes by Potter Stewart, BRAINY QUOTE, http://www.brainyquote.com/
quotes/quotes/p/potterstew114112.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2014), archived at
perma.unl.edu/X5DC-9VU3; see also Justice Potter Stewart Award, COUNCIL FOR
COURT EXCELLENCE, http://www.courtexcellence.org/justice-potter-stewart-award
(last visited Feb. 17. 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/SQU6-ZL8D (detail-
ing biographical and professional information on Justice Potter Stewart).
2. See generally MICHAEL DURBIN, ALL ABOUT DERIVATIVES 29 (2d ed. 2011) (defin-
ing a swap contract as “an agreement to exchange future cash flows”).  More spe-
cifically, a swap can be described as “an agreement between two parties to
exchange payments on regular future dates, where each payment leg is calcu-
lated on a different basis.” ANDREW M. CHISHOLM, DERIVATIVES DEMYSTIFIED 2
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default swaps.”4  A derivative is a financial product whose value is
derived from a specific reference asset or underlying variable, such as
a commodity or an interest rate.5  A financial product that is traded
OTC is not traded on an organized exchange, but instead negotiated
privately between counterparties.6  For example, some banks that ac-
(2d ed. 2011).  For example, in an interest rate swap, one party will agree to pay a
fixed interest rate on a set notional amount (e.g., $100 million) at regular inter-
vals for a specific period of time (e.g., 20 years), while the other party agrees to
pay a floating interest rate on the same notional amount. DURBIN, supra, at
29–32.  These kinds of financial products were collectively referred to as “swaps”
in the industry; however, after the financial crisis, federal laws now divide deriv-
atives into categories that include swaps, security-based swaps, mixed swaps,
and security-based swap agreements. See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 1a(42), (47) (2012) (defining the terms “swap,” “security-based swap,” and
“mixed swap”).  For the purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to know the
specific contours of each sub-category of derivative financial product.
3. Barbara Crutchfield George & Lynn Vivian Dymally, The End of an Era of Lim-
ited Oversight, 25 FLA. J. INT’L L. 207, 212 n.17 (2013) (defining a collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) as “an investment-grade security backed by a pool of
bonds, loans, and other assets” (quoting Collateralized Debt Obligation, INVES-
TOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cdo.asp (last visited Feb. 17,
2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/A9AK-3Y5F) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REP. ON THE CAUSES OF THE
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE U.S. 118 (2011) [hereinafter FCIC FINAL
REPORT] (describing CDOs as “structured financial instruments that purchase
and pool financial assets, such as the riskier tranches of various mortgage-backed
securities” and detailing how CDOs were created).
4. See Timothy E. Lynch, Derivatives: A Twenty-First Century Understanding,
43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 22 (2011) (defining credit default swaps (CDSs) as swaps
“whose payoffs are derived from the occurrence or non-occurrence of a ‘credit
event’ of some reference entity or entities, such as the bankruptcy of an identified
corporation, a debt default by some foreign government, or the third default
within a basket of bonds”); Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the
Credit Default Swap Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 170 (2011) (“Credit de-
fault swaps are agreements that, in simplest terms, offer insurance-like protec-
tion against the risk of a debtor’s default on debt obligations.”); 156 CONG. REC.
S5,821 (daily ed. July 14, 2010) (statement of Sen. Merkley), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/4XN-EUF5 (“Then we had credit default swaps.  That is a fancy
term for insurance on the success of a bond.”).
5. Kelly S. Kibbie, Dancing with the Derivatives Devil: Mutual Funds’ Dangerous
Liaison with Complex Investment Contracts & the Forgotten Lessons of 1940,
9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 195, 196 n.1 (2013) (“Derivatives are broadly defined as
financial instruments whose value is derived from other variables (referred to as
‘reference assets’ or ‘underliers’).”); see also Timothy E. Lynch, Gambling by An-
other Name: The Challenge of Purely Speculative Derivatives, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 67, 71 (2011) (“More precisely, a derivative is simply an aleatory contract
between two counterparties wherein the payoffs to and/or from each counterparty
depend on the outcome of one or a set of extrinsic, future, uncertain event(s) and/
or metric(s) and wherein each counterparty expects an outcome opposite to that
expected by the other counterparty.”).
6. See CHISOLM, supra note 2, at 1 (defining a financial product that is traded over-
the-counter (OTC) as one that is not traded on an organized exchange but instead
agreed upon directly with dealers); see also Kibbie, supra note 5, at 200 (“OTC
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ted as OTC derivative dealers7 pulled toxic assets off their own bal-
ance sheets and put them into OTC derivatives without disclosing to
counterparties that the derivatives contained underlying assets, such
as residential home mortgages, which the banks wanted to get rid of
because they expected those assets to perform poorly in the immediate
future.8  In other circumstances, derivative dealers marketed and sold
OTC derivatives at inflated prices while simultaneously refusing re-
quests from counterparties to provide information about how those
prices had been determined.  They would then drastically mark down
the estimated value of those same derivatives almost immediately af-
ter they were sold.9  Some swap dealing banks also neglected to dis-
close materially adverse incentives and other conflicts of interest.
This included instances where banks were betting against the OTC
derivatives to profit from any decreases in the value of those deriva-
tives,10 as well as instances where the assets underlying the OTC de-
rivatives had been selected by parties who likely stood to profit if the
derivatives performed poorly.11
In light of such conduct, congressional leaders wanted to make the
country’s financial markets fair to participants.12  In 2010, Congress
derivatives, the newer category of derivatives, are negotiated agreements that
are executed without exchange involvement.”).
7. Dealer, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dealer.asp (last vis-
ited Feb. 17, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/W7LL-8PG7 (defining a
dealer as “[a] person or firm in the business of buying and selling securities for
their own account, whether through a broker or otherwise”).  More generally
speaking, a dealer is “anyone who buys goods or property for the purpose of sell-
ing as a business.” Dealer, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.the
freedictionary.com/dealer (last visited Feb. 17, 2014), archived at http://perma.
unl.edu/8CX6-8L2T.
8. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, PERMANENT
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 391, 525 (Apr. 13, 2011) [hereinafter
STAFF, SENATE REPORT], archived at http://perma.unl.edu/H7FC-22EV.
9. Id. at 393–94, 557–59.
10. Id. at 391, 527; 156 CONG. REC. S5901 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Levin), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/4TE5-EHT2 (stating that the “hearings
and findings of our Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations . . . dramatically
showed how some firms were creating financial products, selling those products
to their customers, and betting against those same products” and that “[t]his
practice has been likened to selling someone a car with no brakes and then taking
out a life insurance policy on the purchaser”).
11. STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 396, 564–65.
12. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., SPEC. REP. ON REGULATORY REFORM 2
(2009), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8E28-Y3NN.  Indeed, the Congressional
Oversight Panel that issued a Special report on Regulatory Reform in February
2009 stated that the “present regulatory system has failed to effectively manage
risk, require sufficient transparency, and ensure fair dealings.” Id.  Further, the
report states,
[t]he current regulatory system has not only allowed for excessive risk
and an insufficient degree of transparency, but it has also failed to pre-
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enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd-Frank Act)13 that, among other things, directed the U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)14 and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC)15 to promulgate rules requiring cer-
tain large financial institutions to act fairly with their counterpar-
ties.16  To that end, Congress directed financial regulators to impose
strict ethical business conduct standards on the financial institutions
that structured, marketed, and sold OTC derivatives.17  Specifically,
vent the emergence of unfair dealings between actors.  Overt lies are dis-
honest, of course, and lying may trigger legal liability.  But fair dealing
involves more than refraining from outright lying.  Deception and misdi-
rection, [sic] are the antithesis of fair dealing.  When the legal system
permits deception and misdirection it undermines consensual agree-
ments between parties, the very foundation of a market economy de-
signed to serve all individuals.
Id. at 15; see also 156 CONG. REC. S5814 (daily ed. July 14, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Murray), archived at  http://perma.unl.edu/426S-W5SS (“For most Ameri-
cans, this debate is not complex; it is pretty simple.  It is not about derivatives or
credit default swaps; it is about fundamental fairness.”); 156 CONG. REC. S5905
(daily ed. July 14, 2010) (statement of Sen. Stabenow), archived at  http://perma.
unl.edu/FZG4-VBU3 (“It is time we shine a light on derivatives trading and bring
transparency and fairness to this market.”).
13. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/67LV-9G8S.
14. The CFTC is the equivalent to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
but regulates the markets for futures, options on futures, commodity options,
swaps, and certain other derivatives. See generally 2 PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON
& THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION § 4.03 (3d ed. 2004).
15. The SEC has not finalized its fair dealing rule. See Business Conduct Standards
for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants,
76 Fed. Reg. 42,396 (proposed July 18, 2011) (corrected on Aug. 3, 2011).  As ex-
plained in more detail below, the Dodd-Frank Act gave the SEC regulatory au-
thority over security-based swaps and the CFTC regulatory authority over swaps.
16. See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(3)(C) (2012) (stating that
“[b]usiness conduct requirements adopted by the [CFTC] shall . . . establish a
duty for a swap dealer or major swap participant to communicate in a fair and
balanced manner based on principles of fair dealing and good faith”); Securities
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-10(h)(3)(C) (2012) (stating that “[b]usiness conduct
requirements adopted by the [SEC] shall . . . establish a duty for a security-based
swap dealer or major security-based swap participant to communicate in a fair
and balanced manner based on principles of fair dealing and good faith[ ]”).
17. Hearing to Examine the Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivatives: Joint Hear-
ing Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture & H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th
Cong. 10 (July 10, 2009) (statement of Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t
of the Treasury), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/E59Q-2DZQ (“[W]e propose to
require that all OTC derivative dealers and all major market participants be sub-
ject to substantial supervision and regulation, including appropriately conserva-
tive capital margin requirements, and strong business conduct standards . . . .
No dealer in these markets will escape oversight . . . .); Over-the-Counter Deriva-
tives: Modernizing Oversight to Increase Transparency and Reduce Risks: Hear-
ing before the S. Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance and Investment of the Comm.
on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 7 (June 22, 2009) (statement
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the statutory provisions required regulators to create rules mandating
that OTC derivative dealers communicate with counterparties in a
fair and balanced manner based on principles of fair dealing and good
faith.18  The CFTC stated that its fair dealing rule incorporated ex-
isting standards of fair play from the National Futures Association
(NFA) and the futures industry’s self-regulatory organization (SRO),
and that the rule would serve to prohibit the kind of improper sales
practices mentioned above and documented in an official report by the
U.S. Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.19
The CFTC provided little more than general statements about the
kind of communications that the fair dealing rule would prohibit.  For
example, the specific elements or mental state that would be required
for a cause of action under the rule were not clarified.  Although the
CFTC stated that it “would consider providing further guidance” con-
cerning the fair dealing rule,20 the agency has yet to do so.
U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Potter Stewart once said
that “[f]airness is what justice really is”—but what is fairness?  One
dictionary definition of the word “fair” is “free from bias, dishonesty,
or injustice . . . .”21  By comparison, “unfair” refers to conduct that is
“not conforming to standards of justice, honesty, or the like.”22  Unfor-
tunately, those definitions do not provide much help in determining
the specific kind of communications that would violate a fair dealing
rule for swap dealing banks.
of CFTC Chair Gary Gensler), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/PC2J-SMLU
(“We should set business conduct standards to make sure the market is free from
fraud, manipulation, and other abuses.”); Financial Derivatives on Energy Mar-
kets: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy & Natural Resources, 111th Cong.
18 (March 9, 2010) (statement of Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Comm’n), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/4M3A-Q99Z (“There is
now broad consensus that dealers should be regulated for all of their derivative
business, both customized transactions and standardized ones.  [Swap dealers
and major swap participants] should be required to meet business conduct stan-
dards to a) promote market integrity by protecting the public against fraud, ma-
nipulation and other abuses . . . .”).
18. See 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(3)(C); 15 U.S.C. § 78o-10(h)(3)(C).
19. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9770 (Feb. 17, 2012).
20. Id.
21. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 478 (1991 Glencoe Ed.); Fair,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fair (last visited
Feb. 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/42YB-EEUT (defining the term
“fair” as “marked by impartiality and honesty” and/or “free from self-interest,
prejudice, or favoritism”).
22. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1454 (1991 Glencoe Ed.); Un-
fair, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unfair (last
visited Feb. 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/VHN2-UAH7 (defining
the term “unjust” as “marked by injustice, partiality, or deception” or “not equita-
ble in business dealings”).
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Legislatively mandating adherence to a vague principle like fair-
ness may be admirable, but it runs the risk of simply adding an am-
biguous edict to a regulatory landscape that already includes
prohibitions against fraud and misrepresentations.  Indeed, a broad-
based congressional fair dealing directive is unlike existing prohibi-
tions against fraud or various specific forms of improper conduct that
are, by and large, easier to define and recognize than a concept such as
“fair dealing.”  On the other hand, to the extent that a fair dealing rule
can be given sufficient specificity and clarity, it could conceivably
serve as an effective deterrent to improper conduct that existing statu-
tory and regulatory provisions might be unable capture—a mecha-
nism to reach unfair conduct that merits prohibition but might
otherwise fall beyond the reach of existing federal laws and regula-
tions.  This Article seeks to better understand this new duty to com-
municate fairly as it relates to the federal regulation of entities called
swap dealers23 and major swap participants24 (collectively, “swap en-
23. See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(49) (2012) (defining the term swap dealer as “any person who (i)
holds itself out as a dealer in swaps; (ii) makes a market in swaps; (iii) regularly
enters into swaps with counterparties as an ordinary course of business for its
own account; or (iv) engages in any activity causing the person to be commonly
known in the trade as a dealer or market maker in swaps”).  There are currently
98 business entities that are provisionally registered as swap dealers. See Provi-
sionally Registered Swap Dealers, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N,
http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/registerswapdealer (last up-
dated Feb. 10, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/R25Y-GL5L.  Included on
the list of registered swap dealers are many business entities affiliated with the
world’s largest global banks, including Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Deutsche
Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, and Morgan Stanley. Id.
24. See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(33)(A) (2012) (defining the term “major swap participant” as
“any person who is not a swap dealer[,]” but who either “maintains a substantial
position in swaps for any of the major swap categories as determined by the
[CFTC]” or “whose outstanding swaps create substantial counterparty exposure
that could have serious adverse effects on the financial stability of the United
States banking system or financial markets”).  As a general matter, major swap
participants include “entities like the hedge fund [Long Term Capital Manage-
ment] and AIG’s financial products subsidiary.”  156 CONG. REC. S5922 (daily ed.
July 15, 2010) (written statement of Sen. Lincoln).  There are only two provision-
ally registered major swap participants: Cournot Financial Products LLC and
MBIA Insurance Corporation. Provisionally Registered Major Swap Partici-
pants, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegu-
lation/DoddFrankAct/registermajorswappart (last updated Mar. 1, 2013),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/5G2E-V6D5.  Both of those firms went bankrupt
during the financial crisis and were required to register based on their “legacy”
portfolio of swaps.  Matt Cameron & Joe Rennison, Zombie Firms Are First Dodd-
Frank Major Swap Participants, RISK MAGAZINE, March 7, 2013, arvchived at
http://perma.unl.edu/R386-7X4Z (“Credit derivatives product company (CDPC)
Cournot Financial Products and monoline insurer MBIA are the first—and so far,
only—firms to provisionally register as major swap participants (MSPs) under
US Dodd-Frank Act rules, even though both firms are being wound up and have
not done any new credit default swap (CDS) business in more than five years.”).
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tities”),25 with the goal of determining, to the extent possible, the
kinds of communications that the rule prohibits.
Part II of this Article provides background on the relevant portions
of the Dodd-Frank Act and describes the CFTC External Business
Conduct rulemaking.  Part III examines the relevant NFA guidance
that the CFTC indicated that it would look to in interpreting the fair
dealing rule and finds, among other things, that the relevant NFA
precedents prohibit high-pressure sales practices and negligent mis-
representations in promotional material.  Part IV describes the im-
proper swap dealer conduct outlined in the Senate Report that—
according to the CFTC—would run afoul of the CFTC’s fair dealing
rule—much of which involves failures to disclose information, such as
adverse interests and swap pricing methodology.  Part V analyzes
whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contract
law is an appropriate source for additional principles of good faith that
could be used in connection with the fair dealing rule.  Part V con-
cludes that, while contract law jurisprudence is unsuitable as a source
of law for the CFTC’s fair dealing rule, an approach similar to the
“excluder” conceptualization of good faith used in section 205 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts—in which good faith is not affirma-
tively defined but given context through concrete examples of bad
faith conduct—could serve as a framework for providing additional
clarity regarding the kinds of communications that would be consid-
ered unfair under the CFTC rule.  In short, by applying an excluder
conceptualization to the fair dealing rule, the misleading and unfair
communications described in NFA guidance and in the Senate Report
would provide the specific examples of the kinds of communications
that are considered unfair and therefore prohibited.  This Article ends
with a summarization of observations that result from analysis of
NFA guidance, the conduct described in the Senate Report, and the
25. Swap dealers and major swap participants are limited to large financial institu-
tions because one must exceed a significant threshold—measured in terms of bil-
lions of dollars in net notional value in swap transactions—to fit within the
regulatory definitions for swap dealer and major swap participant. See, e.g.,
CFTC Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(ggg) (2013) (stating that a person is not
deemed a swap dealer if “the swap positions connected with those dealing activi-
ties into which the person . . . enters over the course of the immediately preceding
12 months . . . have an aggregate gross notional amount of no more than $3 bil-
lion, subject to a phase in level of an aggregate gross notional amount of no more
than $8 billion.”); CFTC Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(hhh) (2013) (outlining the
two tests for a “substantial position in swaps,” with the first test indicating that a
person with a daily average current uncollateralized exposure is a major swap
participant if such exposure equals or exceeds $1 billion in credit, equity, or other
commodity swaps or $3 billion in rate swaps, and the second test dictating that a
person with a combined daily average current uncollateralized exposure and po-
tential future exposure is a major swap participant if such combined exposure
equals or exceeds $2 billion in credit, equity, or other commodity swaps, or $6
billion in rate swaps).
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application of an excluder conceptualization to the CFTC’s fair dealing
rule.
This Article is the first to undertake in-depth analysis of the Dodd-
Frank Act’s fair dealing mandate for swap entities, and to propose
that an excluder conceptualization as exemplified in Section 205 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts could help provide greater specific-
ity as to the kinds of communications that the fair dealing rule
prohibits.
II. THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND EXTERNAL BUSINESS
CONDUCT STANDARDS FOR SWAP ENTITIES
A. Congress Reshapes the Regulatory Landscape
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which President Obama
signed on July 21, 2010, to address shortcomings in the existing finan-
cial regulatory framework that had become apparent during the finan-
cial crisis, including, but not limited to, the lack of regulatory
oversight for the OTC derivatives market.26  Once enacted, the Dodd-
Frank Act ushered in some of the most substantial changes to the fed-
eral laws governing financial regulation since the Great Depression.27
26. 156 CONG. REC. S5820 (daily ed. July 14, 2010) (statement of Sen. Merkley),
archived at  http://perma.unl.edu/9E2H-Y2NP  (“I rise to address the Dodd-Frank
financial reform bill and to share the reasons it makes a great deal of sense to
restore the lane markers and traffic signals to our financial system—lane mark-
ers and traffic signals that were ripped away carelessly, thoughtlessly over the
course of a decade and led to the economic house of cards that melted down last
year, doing enormous damage to America’s working families. . . .  What really
happened?  It can be summed up in two words: irresponsible deregulation.”); 156
CONG. REC. S5905 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Stabenow),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/A35F-84FF  (“For too long the over-the-counter
derivatives market has been unregulated, transferring risk between firms and
creating a web of fragility in a system where entities became to interconnected to
fail.  It is clear that unregulated derivative markets contributed to the financial
crisis that crippled middle-class families.”); Id. at 5915 (statement of Sen. Reed)
(“On derivatives, the bill closes another huge set of regulatory gaps by overturn-
ing a law that prevented regulators from overseeing the shadowy over-the-
counter derivatives market and, as a result, bringing accountability and trans-
parency to the market.”); Id. at 5932 (statement of Sen. Cantwell) (“[T]his legisla-
tion will be the first time—the first time—the over-the-counter derivatives
market in this country will be regulated. . . .  So the American people will know
something as dangerous as credit default swaps—which brought down our econ-
omy—that now for the first time we will have regulation of these over-the-
counter derivatives. . . .  A $600 trillion market, which is greater than 10 times
the size of world GDP, is a danger to our economy if it is not regulated.”).
27. See James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Con-
fronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 1811, 1811 (2012) (“The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 2010 introduced the most sweeping reforms of financial markets
since the Great Depression.”).
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Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act28 amended the Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA)29—the law that regulates futures, options on futures, com-
modity options, and certain other derivatives—to establish a compre-
hensive new regulatory framework for swaps and security-based
swaps.30  Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFTC received authority to
regulate swaps,31 and the SEC received regulatory authority over se-
curity-based swaps.32  Generally, swaps are derivative financial prod-
ucts that have underlying assets that, inter alia, are commodities,
interest rates, government securities, and broad-based security indi-
ces. Whereas security-based swaps are based on single securities,
loans and reference assets, or narrow-based security indices.33  While
28. Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act is named the Wall Street Transparency and Ac-
countability Act of 2010.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/67LV-9G8S.
29. Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 7 U.S.C.).  The CEA explicitly mentions the importance of fairness to
market participants, stating, inter alia, that derivatives transactions are “af-
fected with a national public interest by providing a means for managing and
assuming price risks, discovering prices, or disseminating pricing information
through trading in liquid, fair and financially secure trading facilities” and that
the purpose of the CEA is “to promote responsible innovation and fair competi-
tion among boards of trade, other markets and market participants.”  7 U.S.C.
§ 5(a)–(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
30. Seema G. Sharma, Over-the-Counter Derivatives: A New Era of Financial Regula-
tion, 17 LAW & BUS. REV. AMERICAS 279, 281–82 (2011); Timothy E. Lynch, Deriv-
atives: A Twenty-First Century Understanding, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 13 n.48
(2011).
31. See CFTC Glossary, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.
cftc.gov/consumerprotection/educationcenter/cftcglossary/index.htm#S (last vis-
ited Feb. 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/AVQ7-6T7X (definition of
“swap”); Lynch, supra note 30.
32. See CFTC Glossary, supra note 31 (definition of “security-based swap”); Sharma,
supra note 30; see also Dodd-Frank: Title VII - Wall Street Transparency and
Accountability, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dodd-frank_ti-
tle_vii (last visited Feb. 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/N3HD-YHTQ
(explaining basic regulatory framework of the Dodd-Frank Act).
33. CEA § 1a(35), 7 U.S.C. § 1a(35) (2012) defines a “narrow-based security index”
as, inter alia, one that consists of nine or fewer securities.  The term, “broad-
based security index,” is not defined in the CEA, but CFTC Regulation 41.1(c)
defines it as any group or index of securities that is not narrow-based.  17 C.F.R.
§ 41.1(c) (2013); see also Arthur W.S. Duff & David Zaring, New Paradigms and
Familiar Tools in the New Derivatives Regulation, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 677,
689 (2013) (“Title VII [of the Dodd-Frank Act] splits oversight of the derivatives
market between the CFTC and SEC, although the division is rather uneven—the
CFTC’s purview reaches the broader swath of current and future products.  The
SEC has been given responsibility over ‘security-based swaps,’ which include in-
struments that reference nine or fewer securities.  All other swaps are subject to
CFTC oversight . . . .); NORA JORDAN ET AL., ADVISING PRIVATE FUNDS: A COMPRE-
HENSIVE GUIDE TO REPRESENTING HEDGE FUNDS, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS AND
THEIR ADVISERS § 4:12 (2011 ed.) (“The definition of ‘swap’ under the Commodity
Exchange Act is expansive . . . .”).
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Congress directed both the SEC and CFTC to promulgate fair dealing
rules, at the time of this writing, only the CFTC’s fair dealing rule has
been finalized.34
As part of its comprehensive regulatory scheme for swaps transac-
tions under the CEA, the Dodd-Frank Act also created two new types
of regulated intermediaries; namely, the aforementioned swap dealers
and major swap participants.35  Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act’s
amendments to the CEA, swap dealers and major swap participants
must register with the NFA—the SRO for the U.S. derivatives indus-
try that oversees the registration of intermediaries in the financial
markets for derivatives pursuant to a delegation of authority from the
CFTC.  In addition, Section 731 of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act
added Section 4s(h) to the CEA, which describes the business conduct
standards for swap entities.36
The Dodd-Frank Act’s business conduct standards for swap dealers
include, inter alia, a prohibition on fraud and manipulation,37 a re-
34. Although this Article focuses on regulation of the swaps markets under the CEA,
Congress tasked the CFTC and SEC with promulgating rules to implement par-
allel statutory directives concerning the regulation of swaps and security-based
swaps.  Section 764 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the Securities Exchange Act
by adding a new Section 15F, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-10.  Specifically, new
Exchange Act Section 15F(h)(3)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-10(h)(3)(C), states that
“[b]usiness conduct requirements adopted by the [SEC] shall . . . establish a duty
for a security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant to com-
municate in a fair and balanced manner based on principles of fair dealing and
good faith.”  15 U.S.C. § 78o-10(h)(3)(C) (2012).  Similarly, Section 731 of the
Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA by adding a new Section 4s(h).  The new CEA
Section 4s(h)(3)(C) uses language that, except for its reference to swap entities
and not security-based swap entities, is identical to new Exchange Act
15F(h)(3)(C). See CEA § 4s(h)(3)(C), 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(3)(C) (2012) (stating that
“[b]usiness conduct requirements adopted by the [CFTC] shall . . . establish a
duty for a swap dealer or major swap participant to communicate in a fair and
balanced manner based on principles of fair dealing and good faith”).
35. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,638, 80,638–39 (proposed Dec. 22, 2010) (stating
that Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act “to reduce risk” by, inter alia,
“[p]roviding for the registration and comprehensive regulation of swap dealers
and major swap participants”).  The Dodd-Frank Act also created two SEC-regu-
lated types of financial intermediaries—“security-based swap dealers” and “ma-
jor security-based swap participants.”  Analysis of SEC regulation of security-
based swap entities is beyond the scope of this Article.
36. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9805 (Feb. 17, 2012) (“Section 731 of the
Dodd-Frank Act, which added new Section 4s(h) to the CEA, gave the [CFTC]
broad new authority to set business conduct standards rules for swap dealers and
major swap participants in response to abuses in the unregulated derivatives
markets. . . .  Section 4s(h) is aimed at reversing a caveat emptor trading environ-
ment and providing transparency in dealings between swap dealers or major
swap participants and their counterparties.”).
37. CEA § 4s(h)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(1)(A) (2012).
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quirement to disclose to counterparties “information about the mate-
rial risks and characteristics of [swaps],”38 and a duty “to
communicate in a fair and balanced manner based on principles of fair
dealing and good faith.”39  Further, CEA Section 4s(h)(2) describes
specific requirements for situations where swap dealers act as
counterparties and advisors to “Special Entities”—defined in CEA
Section 4s(h)(2)(C) as including taxpayer-funded government entities
and municipalities, as well as certain employee benefit plans—with
the goal of ensuring that swap dealers do not take advantage of such
entities.40
B. Regulations Implementing External Business Conduct
Standards
On February 17, 2012, the CFTC published in the Federal Register
final Subpart H of Part 23 of the CFTC’s Regulations, which imple-
ment the External Business Conduct Standards mandated by CEA
Section 4s(h).41  For example, subsection (a)(3) of CFTC Regulation
23.410 (Prohibition on fraud, manipulation, and other abusive prac-
tices) states that it is “unlawful for a swap dealer or major swap par-
ticipant . . . [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business that
is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.”42  That language mirrors
an antifraud provision of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 that
does not require scienter, which is a mental state generally character-
ized by reckless or intentional behavior,43 to prove liability.44  Addi-
38. CEA § 4s(h)(3)(B)(i), 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(3)(B)(i) (2012).
39. CEA § 4s(h)(3)(C), 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(3)(C) (2012); Business Conduct Standards for
Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at
9769 (“The Dodd-Frank Act requires that the [CFTC] establish a duty for swap
dealers and major swap participants to communicate in a fair and balanced man-
ner based on principles of fair dealing and good faith.”).
40. CEA § 4s(h)(2)(A)–(C), 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(2)(A)–(C) (2012).
41. 17 C.F.R. §§ 23.400–23.451 (2013).
42. 17 C.F.R. § 23.410(a)(3) (2013).  “[CEA] Section 4s(h)(1) grants the [CFTC] with
discretionary authority to promulgate rules applicable to swap dealers and major
swap participants related to, among other things, fraud, manipulation and abu-
sive practices.”  Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap
Participants with Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9751.  Section 4s(h)(1)(A)
states that “[e]ach registered swap dealer and major swap participant shall con-
form with such business conduct standards . . . as may be prescribed by the
[CFTC] by rule or regulation that relate to (A) fraud, manipulation, and other
abusive practices involving swaps (including swaps that are offered but not en-
tered into).”  7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(1)(A).
43. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 850 F.2d
742, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding reckless conduct sufficient for scienter); U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Complete Developments, LLC, No. 4:10
CV 2287, 2013 WL 1910436, at *10 (N.D. Ohio May 8, 2013) (describing scienter
as a mental state that encompasses reckless and intentional conduct); CFTC’s
Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,890, 31,895 & n.66 (May 28,
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tionally, CFTC Regulation 23.434 (Recommendations to
counterparties—institutional suitability) requires swap dealers to
“[u]ndertake reasonable diligence to understand the potential risks
and rewards associated with the recommended swap or trading strat-
egy involving a swap; and [h]ave a reasonable basis to believe that the
recommended swap or trading strategy involving a swap is suitable
for the counterparty.”45
Likewise, CFTC Regulation 23.431 (Disclosures of material infor-
mation) requires swap entities to disclose to counterparties “material
information concerning the swap in a manner reasonably designed to
allow the counterparty to assess” the material risks and characteris-
tics of swaps.46  The CFTC stated that “[t]he disclosure rules are de-
signed to address historical information asymmetry between
counterparties and swap dealers or major swap participants and
should enable counterparties to better protect their own interests
before assuming the risk of any particular swap transaction.”47
Under the CFTC’s disclosure rules, the material risks of a swap that
swap entities must disclose include market, credit, liquidity, foreign
currency, legal, operational, and any other applicable risks.48  The
material characteristics of a swap that swap entities must disclose
include the material economic terms of the swap, the terms relating to the
operation of the swap, and the rights and obligations of the parties during the
term of the swap; and [t]he material incentives and conflicts of interest that
the swap dealer or major swap participant may have in connection with a
particular swap . . . .49
2013) (“Recklessness is a well-established scienter standard, which has consist-
ently been defined as conduct that ‘departs so far from the standards of ordinary
care that it is very difficult to believe the actor was not aware of what he or she
was doing.’”) (quoting Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 850 F.2d at 748).
44. The text of CFTC Regulation 23.410(a)(3) is substantially similar to CEA Section
4s(h)(4)(A)(iii). See 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(4)(A)(iii) (2012).  As mentioned previously,
courts have held that this language, when used in securities law statutes, im-
poses liability without scienter.  Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers
and Major Swap Participants with Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9752 & n.242
(citing Section 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-
21; Securities and Exchange Comm’n v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 647 (D.C. Cir.
1992)).  Regulation 23.410(a)(2), which prohibits fraud against Special Entities,
also uses language that has been interpreted as not requiring scienter. Id. at
9753 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 23.410(a)–(b)).  To ease concerns about these
provisions, the CFTC provided an affirmative defense to Regulation 23.410(a)(2)
and (3) claims if the swap entity, inter alia, “[d]id not act intentionally or reck-
lessly in connection with such alleged violation.”  17 C.F.R. § 23.410(b)(1) (2013).
45. See 17 C.F.R. § 23.434(a)(1)–(2) (2013).
46. See 17 C.F.R. § 23.431 (2013).  Regulation 23.431 generally tracks the language
of CEA Section 4s(h)(3)(B), 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(3)(B) (2012).
47. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9814.
48. 17 C.F.R. § 23.431(a)(1) (2013).
49. 17 C.F.R. § 23.431(a)(2)–(3) (2013).
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Material incentives and conflicts of interest include “[a]ny compensa-
tion or other incentive from any source other than the counterparty
that the swap dealer or major swap participant may receive in connec-
tion with the swap.”50
Further, Regulation 23.431(b) requires swap dealers to inform
counterparties that, in connection with any swap not made available
for trading on derivatives exchanges or related platforms, they can
elect to receive scenario analysis—a process that demonstrates how a
particular swap will perform in different market conditions (e.g.,
higher or lower interest rates, increased asset volatilities, etc.)51—“to
illustrate the risks of particular derivative products.”52  Additionally,
Regulation 23.431(d) requires, inter alia, that swap entities provide
counterparties to uncleared swaps with a daily mark including “[t]he
methodology and assumptions used to prepare the daily mark and any
material changes during the term of the swap.”53
50. Id.
51. See Scenario Analysis, INVESTOPEDIA www.investopedia.com/terms/s/scenario_
analysis.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/J8EM-
YYKV; see, e.g., Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap
Participants with Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9762 (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 23.410(b)).
52. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9762 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §23.431(b)).
Scenario analysis, as required by the proposed rule, would be an expres-
sion of potential losses to the fair value of the swap in market conditions
ranging from normal to severe in terms of stress.  Such analyses would
be designed to illustrate certain potential economic outcomes that might
occur and the effect of these outcomes on the value of the swap.
Id. at 9761.
53. 17 C.F.R. § 23.431(d)(3)(i) (2013).
[CEA] Section 4s(h)(3)(B)(iii) directs the [CFTC] to adopt rules that re-
quire: (1) For cleared swaps, upon request of the counterparty, receipt of
the daily mark of the transaction from the appropriate [derivatives
clearing organization]; and (2) for uncleared swaps, receipt of the daily
mark of the swap transaction from the swap dealer or major swap
participant.
Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9767.  “The term ‘daily mark’ is not defined in the
statute, and the [CFTC] understands that the term ‘mark’ is used colloquially to
refer to various types of valuation information.”  Business Conduct Standards for
Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with Counterparties, 75 Fed. Reg at
80,645.  The CFTC defined the term, “daily mark as the ‘mid-market
mark’ . . . [b]ecause ‘mid-market’ represents an objective value, it provides
counterparties with a baseline to assess swap valuations for other purposes, in-
cluding margin or terminations.” Id. at 9768 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 23.431(d)).
The statutory daily mark requirement is meaningless unless the
counterparty knows the methodology and assumptions that were used to
calculate the mark.  To make its own assessment of the value of the
swap for its own purposes, the counterparty has to have information
from the [swap entity] about how the mid-market mark was calculated.
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C. The CFTC’s Fair Dealing Rule
Included among the CFTC’s External Business Conduct Standards
is Regulation 23.43354—referred to as “the fair dealing rule”55—
which, in language that is largely identical to the statute, CEA Sec-
tion 4s(h)(3)(C),56 states that “[w]ith respect to any communication be-
tween a swap dealer or major swap participant and any counterparty,
the swap dealer or major swap participant shall communicate in a fair
and balanced manner based on principles of fair dealing and good
faith.”57  CFTC Regulation 23.433 has the potential to be an impor-
tant component of the Dodd-Frank Act’s regulatory mosaic by prohib-
iting improper conduct that other business conduct standards might
not reach.
[T]he fair dealing rule protects market participants and the public by requir-
ing that communications between swap dealers or major swap participants
and their counterparties are conducted based on principles of fair dealing and
good faith.  The rule raises the standard for communications in the previously
unregulated swaps market and encourages confidence in the swap market by
market participants and the public.58
The CFTC stated:
In determining whether a communication with a counterparty is fair and bal-
anced, the [CFTC] stated that it expects a swap dealer or major swap partici-
pant to consider factors such as whether the communication: (1) Provides a
sound basis for evaluating the facts with respect to any swap; (2) avoids mak-
ing exaggerated or unwarranted claims, opinions or forecasts; and (3) bal-
ances any statement that refers to the potential opportunities or advantages
presented by a swap with statements of corresponding risks.59
The first factor is ambiguous and would benefit from interpretive gui-
dance on the part of the CFTC, although it does show that one purpose
of the fair dealing rule is to ensure that communications provide
Id.
54. See Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants
with Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9769–70 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 23.433).
55. See, e.g., id. at 9769 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 23.433) (referring to Regulation
23.433 as “the fair dealing rule”).  The CFTC also referred to Regulation 23.433
as “the communications-fair dealing rule,” id. at 9811, and “[t]he fair dealing
communications rule.” Id. at 9769 n.496 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 23.433).
The CFTC adopted the fair dealing rule as it was originally proposed. Id. at
9769.
56. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 23.433 (2013), with CEA § 4s(h)(3)(C), 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(3)(C)
(2012).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 23.433; see Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major
Swap Participants with Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9741 (“The final fair
dealing rule will apply to all communications by a swap dealer or major swap
participant in connection with a swap, including communications made prior to
an offer.”).
58. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9813.
59. Id. at 9769.
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counterparties with sufficient information to evaluate swaps.  Conse-
quently, deliberately communicating in a manner that obscured facts
about swaps or made it difficult to evaluate swaps likely would violate
Regulation 23.433.  The last two factors listed are not entirely surpris-
ing, given that federal courts and the CFTC generally have considered
exaggerated and unwarranted claims, as well as unbalanced state-
ments that overly emphasize potential profits or unduly minimize
risks, to constitute fraud under pre-Dodd-Frank Act antifraud provi-
sions of the CEA.60  Furthermore, fraudulent communications also
should violate any conceivable set of principles of good faith and fair
dealing (under Regulation 23.433 or otherwise).61  The adopting re-
lease did not address the extent to which the fair dealing rule might
prohibit exaggerated or unbalanced statements that do not rise to the
level of fraud, although it seems likely that Regulation 23.433 would
do so.  After all, before the Dodd-Frank Act, the CEA already con-
tained several antifraud provisions, and it seems unlikely that Con-
gress would have directed the CFTC to craft a fair dealing duty for
swap entities merely to duplicate existing antifraud measures.
Regulation 23.433 broadly applies to any communications concern-
ing a swap62—including communications with prospective
60. Decisional law under the CEA indicates that material omissions—such as not
mentioning one’s losing investment track record—can be fraudulent, as can un-
balanced communications that exaggerate the likelihood of experiencing profits
while downplaying the risk of losses. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n v. R.J. Fitzgerald & Co., Inc., 310 F.3d 1321, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002)
(“Read for its overall message, and how that message would be interpreted by an
objectively reasonable television viewer, the Commercial overemphasizes profit
potential and downplays risk of loss, presenting an unbalanced image of the
two. . . .  Against these highly alluring statements is only boilerplate risk disclo-
sure language.  We agree with CFTC’s position that these statements directly
contravene the legal principles established in prior commodities fraud cases.”);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Commonwealth Fin. Group, Inc., 874 F.
Supp. 1345, 1353 n.10 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (“Plaintiffs suggest that it amounts to a
misrepresentation when salespeople emphasize the profits enjoyed by Common-
wealth customers without mentioning any of the losses.  The Court agrees.”);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Risk Capital Trading Group, Inc., 452
F.Supp.2d 1229, 1245–46 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (finding failure to disclose investing
track record in which the overwhelming majority of customers had lost their in-
vestments was a material factual omission); In re JCC, Inc., [1992-1994 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 26,080 (CFTC May 12, 1994), aff’d, JCC, Inc.
v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 63 F.3d 1557 (11th Cir. 1995) (“When
the language of a solicitation obscures the important distinction between the pos-
sibility of substantial profit and the probability that it will be earned, it is likely
to be materially misleading to customers.”).
61. In other words, it stands to reason that all fraudulent communication also would
be classified as “unfair,” although some “unfair” communications might not be
fraudulent.
62. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9741.
2014] REGULATING FAIRNESS 47
counterparties63—by swap dealers and major swap participants,64 un-
like some business conduct standards, which only apply to swap deal-
ers.65  The CFTC stated that, “[u]nder all circumstances . . . the
[CFTC’s] fair dealing rule . . . operate[s] as an independent basis for
enforcement proceedings”66 and “ensures that swap dealers’ and ma-
jor swap participants’ communications to counterparties [will not be]
exaggerated and [that] discussions or presentations of profits or other
benefits [will be] balanced with the associated risks.”67  The CFTC
also indicated that the fair dealing rule imposes “ongoing duties” on
swap entities that “continue after the execution of the swap,” such
that the rule applies, for example, to material amendments to the
terms of swaps.68
D. Relationship with Other External Business Conduct
Standards
Congress, in adding Section 4s to the CEA, directed the CFTC to
adopt several different specific kinds of regulations governing the bus-
iness conduct standards for swap entities, including the fair dealing
rule (CEA Section 4s(h)(3)(C)),69 abusive practices rules (CEA Sec-
tions 4s(h)(1)(A) and 4s(h)(4)(A)),70 and disclosure rules (CEA Section
4s(h)(3)(B)).71  Therefore, Congress expressly contemplated that the
behavior of swap entities would be governed by an interwoven net-
work of rules.  In keeping with congressional intent, the CFTC’s
adopting release for the final rules frequently referred to Regulation
23.433 as working in conjunction with other External Business Con-
duct Standards.72  The CFTC stated that “requiring both the disclo-
63. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,638, 80,641 (proposed Dec. 22, 2010) (“For exam-
ple, the fair and balanced communications and fair dealing requirements in pro-
posed [Regulation] 23.433 apply to [swap entities] with respect to both
counterparties and prospective counterparties.”).
64. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9743; see id. at 9770.
65. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 23.434, 23.440 (2013).
66. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9769 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 23.433).
67. Id. at 9811.  “A frequent criticism of the swaps market leading up to the 2008
financial crisis was that dealers engaged in self-dealing to the detriment of cus-
tomers and counterparties, such as by offering swaps and trading strategies that
the dealers knew were unsuitable for the specific counterparty.” Id. at 9809.
68. Id. at 9741.
69. 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(3)(C) (2012) directed the CFTC to promulgate a fair dealing rule.
70. CEA § 4s(h)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(1)(A) gave the CFTC authority to promulgate
an antifraud rule for swap entities.  The CFTC did so using language that
tracked CEA § 4s(h)(4)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(4)(A).
71. The CFTC’s disclosure rules for swap dealers derive from 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(3)(B).
72. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9769 (Feb. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 17
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sure of material information and fair dealing will enhance
transparency and promote counterparty confidence in the previously
unregulated swap market, which better enables counterparties to use
swaps to assume and manage risk.”73
For example, the fair dealing rule can be viewed as supplementing
Regulation 23.431(b), which allows counterparties to elect to receive a
scenario analysis from swap dealers in certain circumstances.
Specifically,
[t]o ensure fair and balanced communications and to avoid misleading
counterparties, swap dealers and major swap participants also [are] required
to state the limitations of the scenario analysis, including cautions about the
predictive value of the scenario analysis, and any limitations on the analysis
based on the assumptions used to prepare it.74
The CFTC stated that providing counterparties with “appropriate
warnings about the assumptions and limitations underlying the sce-
nario analysis” is “consistent with [Regulation] 23.433.”75  In a similar
vein, a swap entity cannot simply provide a counterparty to an un-
cleared swap with a daily mark without also providing background
information about how the mark was calculated because the fair deal-
ing rule, in conjunction with Regulation 23.431(d), “requires disclo-
sure of the methodology and assumptions underlying the daily
mark.”76
Furthermore, the CFTC stated that a single communication could
violate multiple External Business Conduct Standards.  For example,
the adopting release stated that Regulation 23.431(a)(3) requires dis-
closure of “fee rebates, discounts, and revenue and profit sharing” that
swap entities receive “for use of various market infrastructures” (e.g.,
derivatives exchanges or clearinghouses) because those arrangements
“constitute material incentives or conflicts of interest.”77  The adopt-
ing release further stated that “[s]uch disclosure also is encompassed
C.F.R. § 23.433) (stating that “the fair dealing rule works in tandem with both
the material disclosure and anti-fraud rules to ensure that counterparties receive
material information that is balanced and fair at all times”); see id. at 9811, 9813.
“In addition to [CFTC Regulation 23.410], [swap entities] are subject to all other
applicable provisions of the CEA and [CFTC] Regulations, including those deal-
ing with fraud and manipulation (e.g., Sections 4b, 6(c)(1) and (3), and 9(a)(2) of
the CEA (7 U.S.C. 6b, 9(c)(1) and (3), and 13(a)(2)), and [Regulations] 180.1 and
180.2 (17 C.F.R. 180.1 and 180.2)).” Id. at 9752 n.239.
73. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9814.
74. Id. at 9761.
75. Id. at 9763 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 23.431(b)).
76. Id. at 9768 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 23.431(d)).  “The fair dealing communica-
tions rule applies to all communications between a counterparty and a swap
dealer or major swap participant, including the daily mark and termination.” Id.
at 9769 n.496 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 23.433).
77. Id. at 9766 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 23.431(a)(3)).
2014] REGULATING FAIRNESS 49
in the duty to communicate in a fair and balanced manner.”78  Addi-
tionally, “the failure to disclose this information [i.e., about incentives
such as fee rebates, discounts and the like to swap entities from mar-
ket infrastructures] or other material disclosures under the rule may
be a material omission under the [CFTC’s] anti-fraud provisions, in-
cluding [Regulation] 23.410(a).”79  Therefore, one communication—or
omission—by a swap entity could violate the fair dealing rule, disclo-
sure rules, and abusive practices rules.
In explaining what the fair dealing rule requires, the CFTC stated:
The fair dealing rule, like the disclosure rules, is principles based and applies
flexibly based on the facts and circumstances of a particular swap.  For exam-
ple, when addressing the risks and characteristics of a swap with features
including, but not limited to, caps, collars, floors, knock-ins, knock-outs and
range accrual features that increase its complexity, the fair dealing rule re-
quires the swap dealer or major swap participant to provide a sound basis for
the counterparty to assess how those features would impact the value of the
swap under various market conditions during the life of the swap.  In a com-
plex swap, where the risks and characteristics associated with an underlying
asset are not readily discoverable by the counterparty upon the exercise of
reasonable diligence, the swap dealer or major swap participant is expected,
under both the disclosure rule and fair dealing rule, to provide a sound basis
for the counterparty to assess the swap by providing information about the
risks and characteristics of the underlying asset.  The fair dealing rule also
will supplement requirements to inform counterparties of material incentives
and conflicts of interest that would tend to be adverse to the interests of a
counterparty in connection with a swap, particularly in situations like those
referenced in the Senate Report.  In this regard, a swap dealer or major swap
participant will have to follow policies and procedures reasonably designed to
ensure that the content and context of its disclosures are fair and complete to
allow the counterparty to protect itself and make an informed decision.80
The fair dealing rule also applies to communications subject to the
institutional suitability rule and CFTC Regulations governing re-
quirements for communications with Special Entities.  For example,
the CFTC stated that “[d]epending on the facts and circumstances, a
violation of the suitability duty may also violate other rules, including
the anti-fraud and fair dealings rules.”81  The CFTC also noted that
all communications by swap dealers with Special Entities “must be
made in a fair and balanced manner based on principles of fair dealing
and good faith in compliance with [Regulation] 23.433.”82
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 9769–70 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 23.433).
81. Id. at 9772 n.538 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R § 23.434).  Also, two of the abusive
practices rules—Regulation 23.410(a)(1) and (2)—prohibit fraud by swap entities
in their interactions with Special Entities.  17 C.F.R. § 23.410(a)(1)–(2) (2013).
82. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9784 (Feb. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 23.440).
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Additionally, the CFTC stated that the fair dealing and disclosure
rules serve common regulatory objectives.
The disclosure and fair dealing regime imposed by Section 4s(h) reverses the
caveat emptor environment that permeated the unregulated derivatives mar-
ketplace prior to enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act and afforded little trans-
parency or protection for either sophisticated counterparties or Special
Entities.  Legislative history indicates that the business conduct standards in
Section 4s(h) were the result of widespread concerns about sharp practices
and significant information asymmetries between swap dealers and their
counterparties that created significant imbalances in their respective bargain-
ing power and the assumption of unanticipated risks by counterparties. The
disclosure and fair dealing rules implement the statutory objective of trans-
parency for all swap transactions.83
The CFTC stated further that, in implementing the External Busi-
ness Conduct Standards, it sought “to limit the ability of dealers to
employ abusive practices that could disadvantage market participants
that are less sophisticated or have less market power.”84  Regulation
23.433 is a key component of the CFTC’s efforts to meet that objective
because “[t]he fair dealing rule requires swap dealer and major swap
participant communications to be fair and balanced and restricts mis-
leading or other potentially abusive communications that could under-
mine the price discovery function of the swap market.”85
While the fair dealing, abusive practices, and disclosure rules are
designed to work together to prohibit improper acts on the part of
swap entities, the extent to which one of the rules would prohibit con-
duct that the others would permit (and vice versa) is unclear.  Con-
gress directed the CFTC to craft three different business conduct
standards—fair dealing, abusive practices, and disclosure—and Con-
gress likely would not have done so if it had believed that those three
standards would be entirely redundant.  Therefore, the fair dealing
rule likely reaches at least some communications that the abusive
practices and disclosure rules do not cover.86  To better discern the
fair dealing rule’s scope, derivatives industry guidance might be
helpful.
83. Id. at 9811.
84. Id. at 9805–9806; see Duff & Zaring, supra note 33, at 692 (“Swap dealers must
treat their counterparties with respect—that is, they may be held to representa-
tions on which those counterparties could reasonably rely, a basic tenet of con-
tract law’s estoppel function, but one of previously more suspect applicability in
the rough and tumble world of derivatives traders—and must communicate with
them in a fair and balanced manner.”).
85. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9813.
86. Likewise, the disclosure rules probably mandate some disclosures that, if omit-
ted, would not rise to the level of making a communication unfair in violation of
Regulation 23.433 or fraudulent in violation of Regulation 23.410.
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III. LOOKING TO NFA GUIDANCE WHEN INTERPRETING
THE FAIR DEALING RULE
A. Industry Familiarity with SRO “Precedents”
The CFTC sought to alleviate concerns about the ambiguous na-
ture of Regulation 23.433 by stating that the CFTC “will look to” and
“consider NFA guidance when interpreting [CFTC Regulation]
23.433,”87 such as NFA’s “customer communications rule.”88  The SEC
took an identical approach in its own proposed fair dealing rule, citing
to the customer communications rule of the securities industry SRO,
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).89  Indeed, the
CFTC stated that its approach in adopting Regulation 23.433 was
“harmonized with the SEC’s proposed Fair and Balanced Communica-
tions rule for [security-based swap] Entities.”90  The CFTC also stated
that its fair dealing rule and other External Business Conduct Stan-
dards are based on principles that “are well established in the futures
and securities markets, particularly through [the rules of industry
self-regulatory organizations (SROs),]”91 and that, accordingly, adopt-
ing the fair dealing rule to cover the behavior of swap entities “harmo-
nizes” the fair dealing obligations in the swaps markets with those in
the futures and securities markets.92  Notably, the CFTC stated that
“SRO rules, in particular, provide a useful model because historically
87. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9770 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 23.433) (stating
that the CFTC would “look to NFA guidance when interpreting” the fair dealing
rule); id. at 9812 (stating that the CFTC would “consider NFA guidance when
interpreting” the fair dealing rule).
88. Id. at 9769.
89. Business Conduct Standards for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Secur-
ity-Based Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,396, 42,418–19 (July 18, 2011).
90. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9811 n.968.
91. Id. at 9769; see id. at 9735 n.9 (“The proposed and final rules are informed by
existing requirements for market intermediaries under the CEA and [CFTC]
Regulations, the federal securities laws, self-regulatory organization (‘SRO’)
rules, prudential regulator standards for banks, industry ‘best practices’ and re-
quirements applicable under foreign regulatory regimes.”); id. at 9742 (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. § 23.400) (“Many of the discretionary rules adopted by the
[CFTC] are based generally on existing [CFTC] and SRO rules for registrants and
industry best practices, and extending them to swap dealers and, where appropri-
ate, to major swap participants will promote regulatory consistency.”).
92. Id. at 9811 (“The fair dealing rule also benefits swap dealers and major swap
participants by harmonizing the statutory requirements with similar protections
that currently apply to registrants in the futures and securities markets.”); id. at
9812 (“The Commission believes harmonizing with existing SRO rules and prece-
dents in the futures and securities markets diminishes the potential costs associ-
ated with legal uncertainty.”).
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the [CFTC] has relied on SROs to regulate conduct that is unethical or
otherwise undesirable, but may not be fraudulent.”93
Because the CFTC stated that it would “look to” and “consider”
“NFA guidance” when interpreting the fair dealing rule,94 a closer ex-
amination of relevant NFA rules and interpretive notices is necessary
to better understand Regulation 23.433.  Under the CEA (as amended
by the Dodd-Frank Act) and CFTC Regulations, futures exchanges
(contract markets), swap execution facilities, and registered futures
associations serve as SROs, in which capacity they are subject to over-
sight by the CFTC.95  The NFA, which started operations in 1982, is
the only registered futures association.96  As mentioned previously,
the Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA to enable the CFTC—which
previously had regulated, inter alia, the markets for futures, options
on futures, and commodity options—to also regulate the markets for
swaps and other OTC derivatives.  Accordingly, the NFA’s jurisdiction
expanded to include swap entities, as the CFTC delegated to the NFA,
inter alia, administration of the registration process for swap enti-
ties.97  Section 17(p)(3) of the CEA mandates that each registered fu-
tures association adopt rules to “establish minimum standards
governing the sales practices of its members and persons associated
93. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,638, 80,639 n.11 (proposed Dec. 22, 2010) (citing
NFA Compliance Rule 2-4, Just and Equitable Principles of Trade); see Business
Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9806 (“Where possible, the rules are harmonized
with requirements in related market sectors, industry best practice recommenda-
tions and SRO rules.”).  This statement also is further evidence that the CFTC
intends for the fair dealing rule to prohibit “undesirable” behavior that does not
rise to the level of fraud.
94. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9770 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 23.433) (stating
that the CFTC “is confirming that it will look to NFA guidance when interpreting
[Regulation] 23.433”).
95. 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(ee) (2013).
96. See NFA Manual, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfamanual/
NFAManual.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
7G3M-FE8S; Gary Rubin, CFTC Regulation 1.59 Fails to Adequately Regulate
Insider Trading, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 599, 606 (2008–09) (“The 1974 [Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission Act] also authorized the creation of ‘registered
futures associations.’  This legislation led to the establishment of the [NFA], a
nationwide SRO, for the futures industry, in 1982.”).
97. Registration of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77 Fed. Reg. 2613,
2619 (Jan. 19, 2012) (stating “the [CFTC] intends to delegate its full registration
authority under the CEA and its regulations to NFA with respect to applicants
for registration, and registrants, as [a swap dealer or major swap participant]”);
Performance of Registration Functions by National Futures Association with Re-
spect to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77 Fed. Reg. 2708, 2709
(Jan. 19, 2012) (CFTC Order “authorizing NFA . . . to perform the full range of
registration functions under the CEA and the [CFTC’s] regulations with regard
to [Swap Dealer]s and [Major Swap Participant]s”).
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therewith.”98  In keeping with that mandate, the NFA establishes and
enforces standards of professional conduct among market partici-
pants.99  Under CFTC oversight, the NFA passes rules and performs
audits and examinations of market intermediaries to ensure compli-
ance with those rules.100
The NFA also takes disciplinary actions against Members and As-
sociates101 that violate its rules and provides a forum for arbitration
and mediation of disputes.102  The NFA has the authority to discipline
any Member or Associate that is required to register with the
CFTC.103  The NFA’s Compliance Department monitors Members and
Associates for compliance with NFA’s financial and business conduct
rules.104  If Compliance Department staff members believe that a
Member or Associate has violated an NFA Rule, they prepare a writ-
ten report about the matter, which is submitted to the NFA’s Business
Conduct Committee.105  The Business Conduct Committee then deter-
mines whether to serve a written complaint outlining the alleged vio-
98. CEA § 17(p)(3), 7 U.S.C. § 21(p)(3) (2012).
99. See About NFA, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-about-
nfa/index.HTML (last visited Feb. 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
FLF8-JGRV (“National Futures Association (NFA) is the self-regulatory organi-
zation for the U.S. derivatives industry, including on-exchange traded futures,
retail off-exchange foreign currency (forex) and OTC derivatives (swaps).”).
100. See Kurtis J. Ward, The Futures Industry: From Commodities to the Over-The-
Counter Derivatives Markets—Origin, Purpose, Development, Controversy, and
Regulation of the Most Volatile Financial Contracts in the World, 12 PIABA B.J.
8, 13 (2005) (“The NFA performs several regulatory activities such as (1) auditing
members to enforce compliance with NFA financial requirements; (2) establish-
ing and enforcing rules and standards for customer protection; (3) conducting ar-
bitration of futures-related disputes; and (4) performing screening to determine
fitness to become or remain an NFA member.”).
101. NFA defines the term, “Member,” to mean member of the NFA, and the term,
“Associate,” to mean an “associated person” (AP) as defined by the CEA and
CFTC Regulations. See Article of Incorporation XVIII(c), (q), NAT’L FUTURES
ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=ARTI
CLE%20XVIII&Section=2 (last visited Feb. 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.
unl.edu/SFL2-KVNR (defining “associate” and “member”).  Generally speaking,
an AP is a natural person who is a salesperson for a registered intermediary or
who supervises salespeople. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(aa)(3) (2013) (defining, for exam-
ple, an AP of a CPO as “any natural person who is associated . . . with . . . [a]
commodity pool operator as a partner, officer, employee, consultant, or agent (or
any natural person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions),
in any capacity which involves (i) the solicitation of funds, securities, or property
for a participation in a commodity pool or (ii) the supervision of any person or
persons so engaged”).
102. See NFA Manual, supra note 96 (describing, inter alia, “Disciplinary
Proceedings”).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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lations.106  Penalties can include, among other things, a censure, a
reprimand, a fine not to exceed $250,000 per violation, expulsion, or
suspension from NFA membership for a specified period.107  Decisions
in NFA disciplinary cases are posted on the NFA’s website.108  The
decisions provide guidance concerning the specific kind of conduct pro-
hibited by NFA rules.109
In adopting the External Business Conduct Standards, the CFTC
stated that Regulation  24.431(a)(1) would impose “duties [on swap en-
tities that] are consistent with longstanding legal, regulatory and in-
dustry best practice standards, which are familiar to the financial
services industry and the OTC derivatives industry.”110  Indeed, the
CFTC stated that “[t]he duty to communicate in a fair and balanced
manner is one of the primary requirements of the NFA customer com-
munications rule and is designed to ensure a balanced treatment of
potential benefits and risks [of a swap transaction].”111  The CFTC
also supported its argument that the principles behind the fair dealing
rule were “well established in the futures and securities markets”112
by citing the following sources (among others):
(1) CFTC Regulation 170.5, which (as quoted in the External
Business Conduct Standards adopting release) states that “[a]
futures association must establish and maintain a program
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Enforcement and Registration Actions, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.fu
tures.org/news/newsActionsList.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2014), archived at http:/
/perma.unl.edu/XNK6-HBQ2.
109. Interpretative Notice 9003, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfa
manual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=9003&Section=9 (last visited Feb. 23, 2014),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/5VJA-SCNK (“[NFA Compliance Rules] are gen-
eral in nature and may not always provide specific guidance as to what particular
conduct may be prohibited.  It is expected that more detailed content will be given
to those general rules through the work of NFA’s Business Conduct Committees,
which will issue decisions in disciplinary cases applying the rules to specific
conduct.”).
110. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9761 (Feb. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 23.431(a)(1)); see Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Ma-
jor Swap Participants with Counterparties, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,638, 80,639 (proposed
Dec. 22, 2010).
111. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9769.
112. See id. at 9769; id. at 9811 (“The fair dealing rule also benefits swap dealers and
major swap participants by harmonizing the statutory requirements with similar
protections that currently apply to registrants in the futures and securities mar-
kets.”); see also Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap
Participants with Counterparties, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80,646 (citing NFA Compliance
Rule 2-29(b)(2), (5) and NFA Interpretive Notice 9043).
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for . . . the adoption of rules . . . to promote fair dealing with
the public.”113
(2) NFA Compliance Rule 2-29—Communications with the Public
and Promotional Material—which, inter alia, prohibits fraud
and high-pressure sales practices;114
(3) NFA Interpretive Notice 9041—Obligations to Customers and
Other Market Participants—which states that, “[s]ince NFA
is a registered futures association, the [CEA] requires it to
have rules designed to promote fair dealing with customers
and other market participants”115 and notes that NFA Com-
pliance Rule 2-4116 “includes a requirement to deal fairly with
customers and other market participants at all times;”117
(4) NFA Interpretive Notice 9043—NFA Compliance Rule 2-29:
Use of Past or Projected Performance; Disclosing Conflicts of
Interest for Security Futures Products118—which, as the Ex-
ternal Business Conduct Rules adopting release notes, states
that “performance must be presented in a balanced
manner.”119
The adopting release further stated that “[t]he [CFTC] concludes
that the futures and securities industry familiarity with these prece-
dents [i.e., NFA guidance] considerably mitigates concerns about legal
113. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9769 n.484.
114. Rule 2-29. Communications with the Public and Promotional Material, NAT’L FU-
TURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=
RULE%202-29&Section=4 (last visited Feb. 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.
unl.edu/CA3W-UP3Q.
115. Interpretive Notice 9041, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/
nfamanual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=9041&Section=9 (last visited Feb. 23,
2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/B2AH-XTCY.
116. Rule 2-4. Just and Equitable Principles of Trade, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N,   http://
www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=RULE%202-4&Sec-
tion=4 (last visited Feb. 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/C3ZX-P3QT
(stating that NFA “[m]embers and Associates shall observe high standards of
commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade in the conduct of
their commodity futures business”).
117. Interpretative Notice 9041, supra note 115 (“Under NFA Compliance Rule 2-4 and
2-29(a)(1), all communications with the public regarding securities futures prod-
ucts must be based on principles of fair dealing and good faith and no material
fact or qualification may be omitted if the omission, in light of the context of the
material presented, would cause the communication to be misleading.”).
118. Interpretative Notice 9043, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, https://www.nfa.futures.org/
nfamanual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=9043&Section=9 (lasted visited Feb. 23,
2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/F6C6-3URG (stating that “NFA Compli-
ance Rule 2-29 imposes high standards on Members’ and Associates’ communica-
tions with the public.”).
119. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9769 n.485 (Feb. 17, 2012).
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certainty as a result of the principles based rule.”120  Accordingly, a
deeper examination of the “precedents” cited by the CFTC should pro-
vide greater clarity regarding the kinds of communications that the
fair dealing rule prohibits.
1. NFA Compliance Rules 2-2 and 2-4
NFA Compliance Rule 2-2 prohibits Members and Associates from
engaging in a laundry list of improper acts against “commodity fu-
tures customers.”121  The list of prohibitions includes, but is not lim-
ited to, cheating, defrauding or deceiving customers, engaging in
manipulative acts or practices, and embezzling money.122  NFA Com-
pliance Rule 2-4 (Just and Equitable Principles of Trade) states,
“Members and Associates shall observe high standards of commercial
honor and just and equitable principles of trade in the conduct of their
commodity futures business.”123  The NFA has interpreted Compli-
ance Rule 2-4 to require “each [futures commission merchant] Mem-
ber, or in the case of introduced accounts, the Member introducing the
account[, to] make available to its customers, prior to the commence-
ment of trading, information concerning the costs associated with fu-
tures transactions.”124
2. NFA’s Customer Communications Rule
The External Business Conduct Standards adopting release im-
plies that the NFA customer communications rule—Compliance Rule
2-29—and associated Interpretive Notices are among the most impor-
tant precedents to consider when interpreting Regulation 23.433.125
120. Id. at 9770 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 23.433).
121. Rule 2-2. Fraud and Related Matters, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.
futures.org/nfaManual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=RULE%202-2&Section=4 (last
visited Feb. 17, 2014) archived at http://perma.unl.edu/64B4-EWTC.
122. Id.
123. Rule 2-4. Just and Equitable Principles of Trade, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://
www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=RULE%202-4&Sec
tion=4 (last visited Feb. 17, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/SC2E-ENMX.
Currently, Compliance Rule 2-4 only refers to “commodity futures business.” Id.
But the NFA, in keeping with its post-Dodd-Frank Act role as the SRO for swap
entities that must register with the CFTC, will likely update the rule in the fu-
ture to include swaps.  Additionally, NFA bylaws currently define “futures” to
include exchange-traded options and leverage contracts, but not swaps. See Rule
1-1. Definitions (p), NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfamanual/
NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=RULE%201-1&Section=4 (last visited Feb. 17, 2014),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/C9AU-3Q5S (definition of “futures”).
124. Interpretive Notice 9005, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfa
Manual/NFAManual.aspx#5 (last visited Feb. 17, 2014), archived at http://per
ma.unl.edu/M3B4-3MRH.
125. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9769 (Feb. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 23.433).
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Compliance Rule 2-29(a) states that “[n]o Member or Associate shall
make any communication with the public which:  (1) operates as a
fraud or deceit; (2) employs or is part of a high-pressure approach; or
(3) makes any statement that futures trading is appropriate for all
persons.”126  Compliance Rule 2-29(b) prohibits communications in
promotional materials that, inter alia,
(1) [are] likely to deceive the public; (2) contain[ ] any material misstatement
of fact or which the Member or Associate knows omits a fact if the omission
makes the promotional material misleading; (3) mention[ ] the possibility of
profit unless accompanied by an equally prominent statement of the risk of
loss; [or] (4) include[ ] any reference to actual past trading profits without
mentioning that past results are not necessarily indicative of future
results . . . .127
Compliance Rule 2-29(c) establishes guidelines for the use of hypo-
thetical performance results, including required disclaimers.128  Addi-
tionally, Compliance Rule 2-29(d) states that “[s]tatements of opinion
included in promotional material must be clearly identifiable as such
and must have a reasonable basis in fact.”129
3. NFA Interpretive Notices on the Customer Communications
Rule
i. Interpretive Notice 9003—Section-by-Section Analysis of
the Customer Communications Rule
NFA issued Interpretive Notice 9003 in connection with the adop-
tion of Compliance Rule 2-29 in 1985.130  Interpretive Notice 9003
states that the NFA fulfills its responsibility under CEA section
17(p)(3) to establish minimum standards governing sales practices for
its members by establishing Compliance Rules, “which, among other
things, generally prohibit fraud and deceit and require Members and
Associates to ‘observe high standards of commercial honor and just
and equitable principles of trade in the conduct of their commodity
futures business.’”131
Interpretive Notice 9003 states, “Rule 2-29 is intended to apply to
all communications with the public by a Member or Associate without
exception if the communication relates in any way to the solicitation of
126. Rule 2-29. Communications with the Public and Promotional Material, supra
note 114, at (a)(3).  Compliance Rule 2-29(a)(3), like other NFA guidance, states
that Members and Associates shall not “make[ ] any statement that futures trad-
ing is appropriate for all persons” without mentioning swaps. Id. The NFA likely
will update its guidance to mention swaps, but, notwithstanding this omission,
the NFA is the SRO for swap entities and other swap intermediaries that must
register with the CFTC.
127. Id. § 2-29(b).
128. Id. § 2-29(c).
129. Id. § 2-29(d).
130. Interpretive Notice 9003, supra note 109.
131. Id.
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an account, agreement or transaction in the conduct of the Member’s
or Associate’s business in futures as the term ‘futures’ is now or may
be defined.”132  Section (a) of Compliance Rule 2-29 covers “routine” or
“day-to-day” communications with customers,133 whereas section (b)
of Rule 2-29 governs communications contained in “promotional mate-
rial,” which is interpreted broadly to cover “most communications with
the public”134 and includes, inter alia, websites, newspaper and maga-
zine advertisements, direct mail, radio and television commercials,
newsletters, seminars, sales scripts, cover letters, standardized phone
solicitations, and email.135  Interpretive Notice 9003 states that,
under section (a) of Rule 2-29 (General Prohibition), “routine customer
contact would not run afoul of Rule 2-29 as long as it is not fraudulent
or deceitful, is not high-pressure in nature and does not contain any
statement that futures trading is appropriate for all persons.”136  In-
terpretive Notice 9003 further stated that, in regard to Rule 2-29(a),
routine communications do not “operate as a fraud or deceit in the
132. Id.  The definition of the term, “futures” includes exchange-trade options. Bylaw
1507. Definitions, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/
NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=BYLAW%201507&Section=3 (last visited Feb. 17,
2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/Y9DJ-F5NF.  Article XVIII, for example,
defines the term “futures” as “includ[ing] options contracts traded on a contract
market, and such other commodity-related instruments as the Board may from
time to time declare by bylaw to be properly a subject of NFA regulation and
oversight.” Article of Incorporation XVIII(k), supra note 101.  Again, the NFA will
probably update Compliance Rule 2-29—and the related Interpretive Notices—to
mention swaps. See id. at art. XVIII(w) (defining the term “swaps” to mean
“swaps as used and defined in the [CEA] and in the [CFTC] Rules, and such other
swap-related agreement, contract or transaction as the Board may from time to
time declare by [b]ylaw to be properly a subject of NFA regulation and
oversight”).
133. Interpretive Notice 9003, supra note 109; A Guide to NFA Compliance Rules 2-29
& 2-36: Communications with the Public & Promotional Material, NAT’L FUTURES
ASS’N (Sep. 2010), http://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-compliance/publication-li-
brary/compliance-rule-2-29.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/N9A2-VQSE
[hereinafter NFA Guide to Compliance].
134. Promotional Material, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfa-faqs/
compliance-faqs/promotional-material/index.HTML (last visited Feb. 17, 2014),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/J9XK-9V8M (stating “except for routine day-to-
day communications, most communications with the public are considered pro-
motional material” in response to the question, “[w]hat is promotional
material?”).
135. See Promotional Material, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/
NFA-new-member/general-requirements/promotional-material.HTML (last vis-
ited Feb. 17, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/ZLG5-RNNL; NFA Guide to
Compliance, supra note 133, at 4.  “[D]ay-to-day communications are spontane-
ous communications that respond to a particular person’s needs and concerns,
while promotional material is prepared or thought out in advance.” Id. at 8.
136. Interpretive Notice 9003, supra note 109.
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absence of . . . intent or recklessness.”137  Interestingly, although the
NFA has interpreted this provision as requiring proof of scienter,
Compliance Rule 2-29(a)(1) mirrors language in CEA Section
4o(1)(B)138 (covering fraud by commodity trading advisors and com-
modity pool operators) that federal courts have interpreted as not re-
quiring scienter.139
In any event, the NFA has stated that scienter is not generally re-
quired to prove violations of section (b) of Compliance Rule 2-29,
which governs the “Content of Promotional Material.”140  Interpretive
Notice 9003 states that Compliance Rule 2-29(b)(1) prohibits the use
of any promotional material that “is likely to deceive the public,”
which means that “[p]roof of violation of this provision does not re-
quire proof of a specific intent to deceive” because “[t]his Subsection
instead places the burden on the Member to determine whether the
material is likely to be deceptive in effect.”141  Interpretive Notice
9003 further states that “to find a violation of this subsection [one]
would have to find that the Member or Associate reasonably should
have been able to determine that the material was likely to
deceive.”142  NFA guidance states that a negligence standard is appro-
priate for misleading communications in promotional material “be-
cause the Member or Associate has had the opportunity to think about
the content of the material.”143
Subsection (2) of Compliance Rule 2-29(b) prohibits Members and
Associates from using promotional material that “contains any mate-
rial misstatement of fact or which the Member or Associate knows
omits a fact if the omission makes the promotional material mislead-
137. Id.  Although, importantly, “[a] communication may be deceptive or misleading
even if no customer or potential customer is actually deceived.” NFA Guide to
Compliance, supra note 133, at 8.
138. CEA § 4o, 7 U.S.C. § 6o (2012) (“(1) It shall be unlawful for a commodity trading
advisor, associated person of a commodity trading advisor, commodity pool opera-
tor, or associated person of a commodity pool operator, by use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly . . .  (B) to
engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a
fraud or deceit upon any client or participant or prospective client or
participant.”).
139. See Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 847 F.2d 673, 677–80 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating
that CEA section 4o(1)(B), 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(B) (2012), “does not require proof of
scienter”); Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Comm’n, 233 F.3d
981, 993 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that the language of CEA section 4o(1)(B) “fo-
cuses upon the effect a [commodity trading advisor’s (CTA’s)] conduct has on its
investing customers rather than the CTA’s culpability, and so does not require a
showing of scienter”).
140. Interpretive Notice 9003, supra note 109.
141. Id.
142. Id. See NFA Guide to Compliance, supra note 133, at 8.
143. NFA Guide to Compliance, supra note 133, at 4.
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ing . . . .”144  NFA Compliance Rule 2-29(b)(2)—along with Rule 2-
29(b)(1)—invokes “a negligence standard” in connection with “mate-
rial misstatements,” but applies a “knowing” standard to omis-
sions.145  Specifically, one “can also be held responsible for factual
omissions if the [person] knew about the omitted fact and the omission
makes the promotional material misleading.”146  But once knowledge
of the omitted fact is established, a reasonableness standard applies to
determine whether the failure to include that fact makes the promo-
tional material misleading.147
Subsection (3) of NFA Compliance Rule 2-29(b), which prohibits
the use of promotional material that “mentions the possibility of profit
unless accompanied by an equally prominent statement of the risk of
loss,”148 “requires a statement of risk to ‘balance’ any discussion of the
possibility of profit.”149  While “the statement of risk” must have
“equal prominence,” that does not “mean that the reference to risk
must be as long as the discussion of the possibility of profit
or . . . impose any unbending measure of prominence” because the ob-
jective of Rule 2-29(b)(3) is to ensure that “the reference to risk of loss
[is not] downplayed or hidden.”150
As the previous discussion illustrates, Interpretive Notice 9003
highlights one distinction regarding the state of mind required to
prove that conduct violates Rule 2-29—a distinction that does not, to
this date, appear to have a parallel in the CEA or in CFTC Regula-
tions.  Specifically, “routine” and “day-to-day” communications with
customers are governed by Rule 2-29(a), which requires proof that the
conduct at issue was intentional or reckless, whereas communications
in “promotional material” are governed by Rule 2-29(b), which evalu-
ates conduct on a “reasonableness” or negligence standard.  Neither
the CEA nor CFTC Regulations require a different state-of-mind for
fraud claims depending on whether the communication at issue is
144. Rule 2-29. Communications with the Public and Promotional Material, supra
note 114, § 2-29(b)(2).
145. Interpretive Notice 9003, supra note 109 (“This knowledge requirement [for omis-
sions] may complicate the proof necessary to establish a violation of this Subsec-
tion.  However, knowledge can be inferred from a pattern of failures to include a
material fact, the omission of which makes the promotional material
misleading.”).
146. NFA Guide to Compliance, supra note 133, at 8.
147. Interpretive Notice 9003, supra note 109.
148. Rule 2-29. Communications with the Public and Promotional Material, supra
note 114, § 2-29(b)(3).
149. Interpretive Notice 9003, supra note 109. See NFA Guide to Compliance, supra
note 133, at 10–11 (discussing the obligation to balance the discussion of profit
potential with a discussion of the risk of loss and addressing issues such as the
font size used for each and the number of times potential profits are mentioned as
compared to potential losses).
150. Interpretive Notice 9003, supra note 109.
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“routine” or contained in “promotional material.”  More importantly,
the fact that the NFA considers email to be “promotional material”
appears to mean that potentially deceptive or misleading communica-
tions contained in email would be evaluated under a negligence stan-
dard, while the same communication in a telephone conversation
would need to have been made intentionally or recklessly for liability
to attach.  If the CFTC were to adopt the NFA’s framework for Com-
pliance Rule 2-29 in determining the appropriate elements of a fair
dealing rule claim, then negligently deceptive communications in
emails and other “promotional materials” would violate Regulation
23.433.  In any event, Interpretive Notice 9003 states that “[w]hether
a communication is deceptive or misleading depends on the content
and the overall impression it makes, regardless of whether it is a day-
to-day communication or promotional material.”151
ii. Interpretive Notice 9025—Hypothetical Performance
Results
Interpretive Notice 9025 states that, “[o]ver the years the use of
hypothetical performance results has repeatedly produced highly mis-
leading promotional material,” which is not surprising given that,
“[b]y their very nature, such performance results have certain
limitations.”152
For example, hypothetical performance results do not represent actual trad-
ing and are generally designed with the benefit of hindsight which may under-
or over-compensate for the impact of certain market factors, including lack of
liquidity and slippage.  Furthermore, since hypothetical trading does not in-
volve financial risk, no hypothetical performance results can completely ac-
count for the impact of certain factors associated with risk, including the
ability of the customer or the advisor to withstand losses or to adhere to a
particular trading program in the face of trading losses.153
The NFA forbids the use of hypothetical trading results “for any
trading program for which the Member has three months of actual
trading results.”154  The CFTC considered—but declined to adopt—a
complete ban on the use of hypothetical performance results; instead,
the CFTC requires persons who use hypothetical performance results
to display the disclaimer set forth in CFTC Regulation 4.41.155  Inter-
151. Id.
152. Interpretive Notice 9025, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/
nfamanual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=9025&Section=9 (last visited Feb. 17,
2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/EH2J-32N9.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. See 17 C.F.R. § 4.41 (2013), which contains the following disclaimer:
These results are based on simulated or hypothetical performance re-
sults that have certain inherent limitations.  Unlike the results shown in
an actual performance record, these results do not represent actual trad-
ing.  Also, because these trades have not actually been executed, these
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pretive Notice 9025 states, however, that “[i]n NFA’s experi-
ence . . . the use of the mandated disclaimer has not prevented
recurring abuses in the presentation of hypothetical results.”156  For
example, some “Members have effectively diminished the impact of
the disclaimer by grossly over-emphasizing the significance of very
dramatic hypothetical profits” by, inter alia, using “promotional mate-
rial which presents hypothetical rates of return in large, bold face
print while the disclaimer can be read only with a magnifying
glass.”157  Similarly, “[i]n other advertising pieces the disclaimer is so
far removed from the touted hypothetical profits that customers may
never find it,” and in other circumstances, “Members or Associates
have attempted to disguise hypothetical performance results as actual
performance results.”158  Interpretive Notice 9025 also noted that
NFA Compliance Rule 2-29(c)(2) “requires Members advertising hypo-
thetical results to disclose their actual results as well.”  Other parts of
Rule 2-29(c) include specific disclaimers that Members and Associates
must display in connection with promotional material that uses hypo-
thetical performance results.159  Members that use promotional mate-
rial with hypothetical performance results must display NFA’s
required disclaimer “as prominently as the hypothetical results them-
selves” and “must also describe in the promotional material all of the
material assumptions that were made in preparing the hypothetical
results.”160
iii. Interpretive Notice 9038—High-Pressure Sales Practices
NFA Compliance Rule 2-29(a)(2) prohibits “high-pressure sales
practices” by Members and Associated Persons (APs).  NFA Interpre-
tive Notice 9038 provides information about the kinds of tactics that
fall within that prohibition.  Interpretive Notice 9038 states that
“NFA Compliance Rule 2-29 governs Members’ communications with
the public and is one of the most important NFA rules in ensuring
that Members observe high ethical standards in their dealings with
results may have under-or over-compensated for the impact, if any, of
certain market factors, such as lack of liquidity.  Simulated or hypotheti-
cal trading programs in general are also subject to the fact that they are
designed with the benefit of hindsight.  No representation is being made
that any account will or is likely to achieve profits or losses similar to
these being shown.
156. Interpretive Notice 9025, supra note 152.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.  (“At a minimum, the description of material assumptions must cover points
such as initial investment amount, reinvestment or distribution of profits, com-
mission charges, management and incentive fees, and method used to determine
purchase or sales prices for each trade.”).
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customers.”161  Interpretive Notice 9038 notes that, while Compliance
Rule 2-29(a)(2) “does not define ‘high-pressure sales prac-
tices’ . . . there have been a significant number of NFA enforcement
cases prosecuted under the rule, and those cases provide guidance to
Members on the types of practices which have been found to constitute
high-pressure sales practices.”162
NFA Interpretive Notice 9038 states:
A common trend in many of the high-pressure sales cases brought by the Busi-
ness Conduct Committee is the sense of undue urgency which the associated
person conveys to the customer.  In essence, the AP is asking the customer to
act now and think later.  This approach can take several different forms.  In
some cases, the AP rushes the customer through the account opening forms,
glossing over the risk disclosures in his haste to open the account. . . .  In some
cases, APs have actively attempted to dissuade unsophisticated customers
from seeking further advice on their investment decision from friends, rela-
tives or advisors or have tried to threaten or intimidate customers.  The pur-
pose of NFA’s rule is to ensure that the customer makes a fully informed and
carefully considered investment decision.  Any tactic, such as those outlined
above, which presses a customer for a hasty decision will be considered a vio-
lation of NFA Compliance Rule 2-29(a)(2).163
Interpretive Notice 9038 indicates that “[a]nother familiar theme
in NFA’s high-pressure sales cases involves a pattern of telephone
calls which are unusual in their timing or frequency.”164  Examples of
such tactics include situations where an AP “barraged the customer
with calls either late at night or early in the morning” and where “the
AP’s telephone solicitations to open an account occurred several times
a day, several days a week for weeks on end.”165  Additionally,
“[p]erhaps the most obvious indicator of a high-pressure sales practice
is simply the tone used by the AP to address the customer.”166   Nota-
bly, “[i]n a handful of cases, APs have shouted at customers, used pro-
fane language or otherwise berated the customer in an attempt to
bully a customer into opening an account,” all of which “clearly vio-
lates NFA rules.”167
161. Interpretive Notice 9038, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfa
manual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=9038&Section=9 (last visited Feb. 17, 2014),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/X3GB-RTYJ.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.  (“Phone calls made at unusual hours and with unusual frequency, unless at
the customer’s request, can be an abusive practice, designed to abuse, annoy or
harass a customer into opening an account and constituting a violation of NFA
Compliance Rules.”).
166. Id.
167. Id.  Interpretive Notice 9038 also states that “[t]his notice cannot and is not in-
tended to alert Members to all of the factors that may constitute a high-pressure
sales practice.” Id.
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iv. Interpretive Notice 9039—Radio and Television
Advertisements
While Interpretive Notice 9038 sheds light on what constitutes
“high-pressure sales practices,” NFA Interpretive Notice 9039 ad-
dresses communications by NFA Members in radio and television ad-
vertisements.168  Interpretive Notice 9039 states, “[a]mong other
things, [Rule 2-29] prohibits the use of promotional material which is
misleading or deceptive” and “[t]he purpose of this rule is to protect
the public from fraudulent advertising and sales solicitations and to
provide guidance to Members on the standards by which their promo-
tional material will be evaluated.”169  Interpretive Notice 9039 states
that the NFA’s Board was “concerned with several types of misleading
radio and television advertisements” whose “consistent theme is that
customers are likely to make substantial profits by following the spon-
soring firm’s recommendations.”170
Interpretive Notice 9039 provides examples of the kind of tactics
used in the misleading advertisements, including the following: (1)
“ads [that] cite seasonal data which supposedly shows that certain
trades produce dramatic profits year in and year out in such products
as heating oil in the winter and unleaded gas in the summer;” (2) ads
that mention historic price moves that suggest that a previous “record
setting [price] move is likely to occur again;” (3) “ads [that] highlight
the tremendous profits which will result from projected price move-
ments which are characterized, directly or indirectly, as conservative
estimates when, in fact, such price movements would be dramatic;”
(4) “ads [that] use price data for a product different from the one being
marketed in the promotional material,” such as “ads that use pricing
data relative to the cash or futures markets to sell options;” (5) “ads
[that] claim that customers can turn a $10,000 investment into
$25,000 or make similar types of dramatic profit projections;” (6) “ads
[that] seek to entice prospective investors by claiming that their cus-
tomers have made dramatic profits; however, such claims rely on iso-
lated trades in specific customer accounts” (i.e., on “ ‘cherry picked’
trades”); and (7) “ads [that] improperly use ‘leverage examples’ as a
means of suggesting that prospective customers are likely to earn
large profits trading futures and options.”171
168. Interpretive Notice 9039, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfa
manual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=9039&Section=9 (last visited Feb. 18, 2014),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/64LB-YU96.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.  NFA Interpretive Notice 9039 seems to combine information from two earlier
notices, namely, NFA Interpretive Notices 9033 and 9034. See Interpretive Notice
9033, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfamanual/NFAManual.
aspx?RuleID=9033&Section=9 (last visited Feb. 18, 2014), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/52YV-AH4X (addressing some, but not all, of the same kinds of
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Interpretive Notice 9039 further states, “this list of deceptive ad-
vertising techniques is not all inclusive” and “[e]ach of the practices
described above presents a distorted and misleading view of the likeli-
hood of customers earning dramatic profits by investing with the
Member, and each of these practices represents a clear violation of
NFA’s sales practice rules.”172  Indeed, an earlier notice—NFA Inter-
pretive Notices 9033—which addresses some of the exact same kinds
of sales practices described in Notice 9039, states that “[a]ny Member
making the types of claims referred to above must be able to demon-
strate to the NFA upon request that the actual performance of its cus-
tomers supports these claims” and “[f]ailure to provide adequate
documentation will constitute prima facie evidence that the promo-
tional material is misleading.”173
v. Interpretive Notice 9043—Examples of Violative Conduct
NFA Interpretive Notice 9043 states that “NFA Compliance Rule
2-29 imposes high standards on Members’ and Associates’ communica-
tions with the public in connection with their futures activities.”174
Notice 9043 further states that the following kinds of statements in
promotional material violate Rule 2-29(b)(1) and (2):
(1) Using outdated information to support current claims;
(2) Making claims regarding research or other facilities beyond
those which the Member or Associate actually possesses or
has reasonable capacity to provide;
(3) Stating that a report, analysis, or other service will be fur-
nished free unless such report, analysis or other service actu-
tactics; namely, (1) claims regarding seasonal trades, (2) claims regarding his-
toric price moves, (3) “cherry picked” trades, and (4) profit projections); Interpre-
tive Notice 9034, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfamanual/
NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=9034&Section=9 (last visited Feb. 18, 2014), archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/D7CJ-ATG6 (addressing deceptive sales practices involv-
ing mention of “mathematical examples of leverage” and “using price moves for
one product to solicit investors for a different product”).
172. Interpretive Notice 9039, supra note 168.
173. Interpretive Notice 9033, supra note 171 (“Members may not engage in a pattern
of advertising or solicitation which makes reference to dramatic profits which
could be achieved in the future or could have been achieved in the past . . . unless
the Member can demonstrate to NFA that, based on the past performance of cus-
tomers, those claims are not misleading.”).
174. Interpretive Notice 9043, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfa
manual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=9043&Section=9 (last visited Feb. 18, 2014),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/WEZ7-2D5C.  Interpretive Notice 9043 ad-
dresses entities involved with security futures which, pursuant to the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) of 2000, are jointly regulated by the CFTC
and SEC. Id.
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ally is or will be furnished entirely free and without
condition.175
Notably, NFA Interpretive Notice 9043 states that, under Rule 2-
29, the use of past performance results in promotional material must
meet the following requirements (among others): (1) “[past perform-
ance results] must be presented in a balanced manner,” (2)
“[p]romotional material must disclose all relevant costs, including
commissions and fees,” and (3) “[f]or security futures products, the
promotional material must indicate the general market conditions
during the period covered.”176  Further, Interpretive Notice 9043
states that Compliance Rule 2-29 requires that the use of projected
performance results in promotional material “have a reasonable basis
in fact,” identify “[a]ll material assumptions,” and include a discussion
of the risks that is “balanced with the discussion of projected
profits.”177
B. Lessons from NFA Guidance for Regulation 23.433
Analysis of the External Business Conduct Standards rule releases
and relevant NFA guidance appears to provide a few insights into
Regulation 23.433.  Most notably, in stating that a swap entity must
communicate in a fair and balanced manner based on principles of
good faith and fair dealing, each part of the previous clause is not a
separate element that the CFTC must prove to state a cause of action
under the fair dealing rule.  Both the proposing and adopting releases
for the External Business Conduct Standards speak broadly about the
kind of communications prohibited by Regulation 23.433 without re-
gard to whether a particular communication is, for example, unfair
but balanced or fair but unbalanced.  Similarly, the CFTC did not, in
its rulemaking, describe factors that would constitute violations of
175. Id.  These kinds of statements also generally are considered violations of pre-
Dodd-Frank Act antifraud provisions of the CEA. See Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Comm’n v. Fitzgerald, 310 F.3d 1321, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002) (“This reckless-
ness is premised on the fact that this Court and the CFTC have previously
condemned attempts to attract customers by: (1) linking profit expectations on
commodities options to known and expected weather events, seasonal trends, and
historical highs; (2) suggesting that the commodities market can be correctly
timed to generate large profits; and (3) substantially inflating profit expectations
while downplaying risk of loss.”); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Brick-
ell Key Fin. L.L.C., No. 04-22549-CIV, 2006 WL 5105621, at *6 (S.D. Fla. July 14,
2006) (sales material that “made references to dramatic historical price moves
with a suggestion that the same dramatic move is likely to occur again” were
fraudulent because “they sought to persuade readers into believing that profits
could be generated in the futures markets based upon known and expected
events” and thereby  “unreasonably exaggerate[d] the likelihood of profits in a
short period of time without presenting a balanced picture of potential risks”).
176. Interpretive Notice 9043, supra note 174.
177. Id.
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principles of good faith, as opposed to fair dealing.  Likewise, the ap-
plicable NFA Compliance Rules and Interpretive Notices do not de-
scribe specific circumstances that would make a communication
unfair as distinct from unbalanced.  Therefore, those terms—fair, bal-
anced, good faith, and fair dealing—do not appear to constitute sepa-
rate elements under Regulation 23.433.  Instead, Regulation 23.433
appears to prohibit unfair communications generally, with NFA gui-
dance providing a source of content for the duty of fair dealing.
Next, if the fair dealing rule incorporates concepts from NFA gui-
dance, then Regulation 23.433 potentially reaches beyond existing
prohibitions of improper conduct under the CEA and CFTC Regula-
tions in three ways.  First, while some communications prohibited by
Compliance Rule 2-29 likely would violate pre-Dodd-Frank Act an-
tifraud provisions in the CEA, the prohibition against non-fraudulent,
high-pressure sales practices is a prohibition that other CEA provi-
sions or CFTC Regulations do not appear to cover.  Therefore, this rep-
resents an area where the fair dealing rule—to the extent that it
incorporates Compliance Rule 2-29’s ban on high-pressure sales prac-
tices—could provide additional protection to swap counterparties.
Second, Compliance Rule 2-29 appears, in some circumstances, to
place the burden on the defendant to prove that statements in promo-
tional material—such as solicitations stating that prospective custom-
ers could achieve dramatic profits in the future or could have achieved
such profits in the past—are warranted or accurate.178  This approach
does not appear to have a corollary in CEA provisions or CFTC
Regulations.
Third, unlike Compliance Rule 2-29(b), the CEA and CFTC Regu-
lations do not prohibit negligent misrepresentations in promotional
material, a term that is broadly interpreted to include a wide swath of
sales communications, from emails to advertisements.  Indeed, other
than CEA section 4o(1)(B)179 and two of the abusive practices rules
(Regulation 23.410(a)(2) and (3)),180 the CEA and CFTC Regulations
generally require a proof of scienter (recklessness or intent) in connec-
tion with fraud claims.181  As such, to the extent that the fair dealing
rule is interpreted as mimicking the NFA’s prohibition against negli-
gent misrepresentations in promotional material, Regulation 23.433
would provide a potentially more expansive remedy against fraud in
178. See Interpretive Notice 9033, supra note 171.
179. 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(B) (2012).
180. See Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants
with Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9753 (Feb. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 23.410(a)) (discussing non-scienter antifraud provisions of Regulation
23.410(a)).
181. For example, claims based on the primary antifraud provision of the CEA, section
4(b), 7 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2012), require proof of scienter.  See Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n v. Fitzgerald, 310 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2002).
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promotional material than existing statutory and regulatory provi-
sions.  Unfortunately, the proposing and adopting releases for the Ex-
ternal Business Conduct Standards do not provide guidance as to the
state of mind necessary to prove a violation of Regulation 23.433.
Thus, without more, there is no clear answer as to the necessary
mental state for a claim under Regulation 23.433.
IV. INVESTMENT BANK MISCONDUCT DETAILED IN THE
U.S. SENATE’S ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE
A comment period followed the CFTC’s December 22, 2010 publica-
tion in the Federal Register of its Proposed External Business Conduct
Standards.  Likewise, the SEC—which published its own Proposed
External Business Conduct Standards for security-based swap dealers
and major security-based swap participants in the Federal Register on
July 18, 2011—also had a comment period on its proposals.  On Au-
gust 29, 2011, the Consumer Federation of America (CFA) and Ameri-
cans for Financial Reform (AFR) submitted a joint comment letter to
the SEC (CFA/AFR Letter).182  While the CFA/AFR Letter com-
mented on the SEC’s Proposed External Business Conduct Standards,
the letter also referenced the CFTC’s Proposed External Business
Conduct Standards.183
U.S. Senator Carl Levin also sent a comment letter to the SEC
(Senator Levin’s Letter) on August 29, 2011.184  Senator Levin’s Let-
ter stated that the U.S. Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investi-
gations, in compiling information for the Senate Report, “examined
the role of investment banks in the financial crisis, exploring how
Goldman Sachs [‘Goldman’] and Deutsch Bank185 [‘Deutsche’] struc-
tured, marketed, and sold high risk, poor quality mortgage products to
investors.”186  Senator Levin urged the SEC to draft its Final External
Business Conduct Standards in a manner that would enable the SEC
to prohibit the kinds of improper investment bank activities refer-
enced in the Senate Report.187  Notably, Senator Levin’s Letter con-
182. See Letter from Barbara Roper et al., on behalf of the CFA and AFR, to Elizabeth
M. Murphy, Sec’y of the SEC (Aug. 29, 2011) [hereinafter CFA/AFR Letter],
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/HS86-TXUW.
183. See id. at 6.
184. Letter from Carl Levin, U.S. Senator, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y of the SEC
(Aug. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Sen. Levin Letter], archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
E5AX-UGH9.
185. Senator Levin’s letter misspelled Deutsche Bank’s name. Id. at 2.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 2–11 (citing STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra note 8).  The CFTC’s Exter-
nal Business Conduct Standards adopting release did not describe the Senate
Report in detail. See Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major
Swap Participants with Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9759 n.357 (Feb. 17,
2012).
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cluded with a section labeled, “Duty to Communicate in a Fair and
Balanced Manner,”188  which stated that the SEC’s proposed fair deal-
ing rule189 was “[c]onsistent with the express text of the statute,” be-
cause, in “track[ing] longstanding principles of exchanges and other
self-regulatory organizations, [the proposed rule was] strongly sup-
ported by the Subcommittee’s work, which found many instances of
misleading and inaccurate communications by [security-based swap]
dealers to investors.”190  Senator Levin concluded his discussion of the
SEC’s proposed fair dealing rule with the following:
[T]o be fair and balanced, communications from [a security-based swap] entity
must inform investors of both the potential rewards and risks of their invest-
ments, and the entity’s own involvement and interests in the investments, in
specific terms.  All material adverse interests must be disclosed and communi-
cated.  The proposed rules should also make clear that it is not enough to in-
form a customer that the [security-based swap] entity ‘may’ have an adverse
interest if that adverse interest already exists.191
Although addressed to the SEC, the CFA/AFR Letter and Senator
Levin’s Letter became part of the record for the CFTC’s External Busi-
ness Conduct Standards rulemaking.192  The two letters are worth
noting because, in adopting its External Business Conduct Standards,
the CFTC specifically referred to the CFA/AFR Letter and Senator
Levin’s Letter in discussing the type of conduct that would be cap-
tured by the CFTC’s fair dealing rule.193  In particular, the CFTC
stated that its Regulations—including the fair dealing rule—would
prohibit the kind of conduct outlined in the Senate Report.194  For ex-
ample, the CFTC’s adopting release stated:
The [CFTC] intends these rules to address the concerns raised by commenters
regarding transactions similar to those profiled in the Senate Report.  The
Senate Report concludes that those transactions, which involved structured
188. Sen. Levin Letter, supra note 184, at 10.
189. Although the SEC has not finalized its fair dealing rule, it is adopting the same
approach as the CFTC.  Both agencies stated that their fair dealing rules would
incorporate industry standards of fairness from their respective SROs.  In the
CFTC’s case, the relevant SRO is NFA; with the SEC, it is FINRA. See Business
Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77 Fed. Reg.
42,418–19 (proposed July 18, 2011).
190. Sen. Levin Letter, supra note 184, at 10.
191. Id. at 11.
192. The letters were submitted to the CFTC for consideration during “external meet-
ings.” See Business Conduct Standards with Counterparts, COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Rulemak-
ings/DF_3_BusConductStandardsCP/index.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2014),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/5LUN-LUB2, for a list of all submissions in con-
nection with the CFTC’s External Business Conduct Standards.
193. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9759 & n.357, 9760–61 (Feb. 17, 2012) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 23.410(a)) (citing, inter alia, the Aug. 29, 2011 CFA/AFR
Letter and the Sen. Levin Letter).
194. See id. at 9759 n.357.
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CDOs, were problematic because they were designed to fail and the disclo-
sures omitted and/or misrepresented the material risks, characteristics, in-
centives and conflicts of interest. Under all circumstances, and particularly
those akin to the Senate Report involving complex swaps, the [CFTC]’s fair
dealing rule will apply and operate as an independent basis for enforcement
proceedings.195
Likewise, another section of the adopting release stated:
Without commenting on the Senate Report’s findings, the [CFTC] considered
how the final disclosure rules would address transactions similar to those pro-
filed in the Senate Report, as requested by commenters.  The final rule ad-
dresses the types of concerns raised by the Senate Report and by commenters
by requiring the disclosure of material risks, characteristics, incentives and
conflicts of interest, as well the duty to communicate in a fair and balanced
manner based on principles of fair dealing and good faith.196
Because the CFTC stated that the fair dealing rule, either by itself
or with other External Business Conduct Standards, would cover the
improper conduct discussed in the Senate Report, a closer look at that
conduct should provide context for the fair dealing rule.
A. Deutsche Bank
In examining the activities Deutsche Bank, the Senate Report pri-
marily scrutinized the activities of the bank’s top CDO trader, Greg
Lippmann, who “repeatedly warned and advised his Deutsche Bank
colleagues and some of his clients seeking to buy short positions197
about the poor quality of the [residential mortgage back securities
(RMBSs)]198 underlying many CDOs, describing some of those securi-
ties as ‘crap’ and ‘pigs.’”199  Portions of the Senate Report describe Mr.
Lippmann’s actions in connection with a CDO named Gemstone CDO
VII Ltd. (Gemstone 7).  Gemstone 7, which issued its securities in
195. Id. at 9769 (emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra
note 8, at 376–636).  CDOs, like other debt securities, are regulated by the SEC.
FCIC, FINAL REPORT supra note 3, at 170.
196. Id. at 9760–61 (emphasis added).  As mentioned above, the disclosure rules con-
tained in the CFTC’s External Business Conduct Standards also would likely
serve to prohibit some of the types of behavior outlined in the Senate Report. See
id. at 9768 n.477 (citing STAFF SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 509–10) (stating
that “the [CFTC] notes that the Senate Report included descriptions of certain
conduct relating to marks where dealers purportedly refused to explain the basis
and methodology for the mark”).
197. A short position is worth more if the derivative decreases in value; a long position
increases in value as the derivative increases in value. See GEORGE KLEINMAN,
TRADING COMMODITIES AND FINANCIAL FUTURES, at xxiv, 7–8 (3d. ed. 2005).
198. “[Residential mortgage backed securities (‘RMBS’)] and mortgage-based CDOs
are debt obligations based on large pools of mortgage loans whose cash flows are
based on principal and interest payments from the underlying mortgages.”  Jef-
frey Manns, Insuring Against a Derivative Disaster: The Case for Decentralized
Risk Management, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1575, 1582 n.17 (2013). See also FCIC, FINAL
REPORT supra note 3, at 73 (describing how RMBSs are created).
199. STAFF SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 319, 330.
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March 2007, was a “hybrid CDO containing or referencing a variety of
high risk, subprime RMBS securities initially valued at $1.1 billion
when issued.”200  Mr. Lippmann “disparaged RMBS securities that, at
the same time, were being included in Gemstone 7, a CDO being as-
sembled by the bank for sale to investors.”201  “Deutsche Bank sold
$700 million in Gemstone securities to eight investors who saw their
investments rapidly incur delinquencies, rating downgrades, and
losses.”202  “The Deutsche Bank sales force aggressively sought pur-
chasers for the CDO securities while certain executives expressed con-
cerns about the financial risk of retaining Gemstone 7 assets as the
market was deteriorating in early 2007.”203  “Deutsche Bank allowed
the inclusion of Gemstone 7 assets which its most senior CDO trader
was asked to review and saw as likely to lose value.”204  “[T]he bank
sold poor quality assets from its own inventory to the CDO” and “ag-
gressively marketed the CDO securities to clients despite the negative
views of its most senior CDO trader, falling values, and the deteriorat-
ing market.”205  Indeed, Deutsche Bank executives pushed its sales
force to sell Gemstone 7 securities as soon as possible because they
“were well aware of the worsening CDO market and were rushing to
sell Gemstone 7 before the market collapsed.”206  Additionally, “the
bank failed to inform potential investors of Mr. Lippmann’s negative
views of the underlying assets and its inability to sell over a third of
Gemstone’s securities.”207
B. Goldman
When bankers at Goldman saw that the value of RMBSs and
CDOs were declining as a result of record homeowner defaults,
Goldman continued peddling them rather than advise clients to stay
away from such financial products.  Meanwhile, Goldman took posi-
tions in CDSs that allowed Goldman to profit in the event that the
RMBSs and CDOs that they were selling declined in value.208  The
Senate Report stated that Goldman’s “abuses included pricing the
swaps higher than its internal valuations, refusing to provide inves-
tors with its pricing methodology and scenarios, and presenting inves-
tors with bid-offer spreads that had little relation to the firm’s
200. Id. at 331.
201. Id. at 320.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 331.
204. Id. at 375.  “While the Gemstone CDO was constructed and marketed by the
bank’s CDO Desk, which is separate from the trading desk controlled by Mr.
Lippmann, both desks knew of Mr. Lippmann’s views.” Id. at 374.
205. Id. at 375.
206. Id. at 366.
207. Id. at 375, 360–61.
208. Id. at 523–26.
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internal valuations.”209  The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on In-
vestigations “uncovered significant evidence of unsuitable recommen-
dations made by investment banks, essentially urging investors to buy
security-based swaps that the investment bank expected or knew were
designed to lose value.”210  The Senate Report further stated the
following:
The evidence discloses troubling and sometimes abusive practices which
show, first, that Goldman knowingly sold high risk, poor quality mortgage
products to clients around the world, saturating financial markets with com-
plex, financially engineered instruments that magnified risk and losses when
their underlying assets began to fail.  Second, it shows multiple conflicts of
interest surrounding Goldman’s securitization activities, including its use of
CDOs to transfer billions of dollars of risk to investors, assist a favored client
make a $1 billion gain at the expense of other clients, and produce its own
proprietary gains at the expense of clients to whom Goldman sold its CDO
securities.211
Goldman “was keenly aware of the poor quality of many of the loan
pools in its warehouse accounts” but “[n]evertheless, during this time
period, Goldman continued securitizing many of those loans and sell-
ing the resulting RMBS securities to clients.”212
1. Hudson
For example, “in the fall of 2006, Goldman assembled Hudson Mez-
zanine 2006-1 (‘Hudson’), a $2 billion synthetic CDO213 that refer-
209. Sen. Levin Letter, supra note 184, at 6.
210. Id. at 9.
211. STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 476.
212. Id. at 487.
213. A “synthetic CDO” can be described as follows:
A synthetic security is a derivatives contract in which payments to and
from each counterparty mimic, simulate, or are a function of the costs
and returns of an actual security or a pool of securities.  For example, a
synthetic collateralized debt obligation (“synthetic CDO”) is a deriva-
tives contract in which the payoffs between the counterparties are based
on how a pool of reference CDOs, mortgage-backed securities, and/or
other debt instruments actually perform.  The mechanical process of
translating the performance of these debt instruments into a synthetic
CDO is typically accomplished by first creating one or more credit deriv-
atives, such as credit default swaps, each referencing one or more debt
instruments, and then pooling these credit derivatives into a collateral-
ized debt obligation.  In other words, the underlying of a synthetic CDO
is typically a single, or a pool of, credit derivatives and thus, a credit
derivative itself.
Lynch, supra note 4, at 27 n.96.  “[Credit default swaps] were essential to the
creation of synthetic CDOs.  These synthetic CDOs were merely bets on the per-
formance of real mortgage-related securities.” FCIC, FINAL REPORT, supra note 3,
at xxiv.
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enced subprime214 [RMBSs]” as a way for Goldman to benefit from its
prediction that subprime RMBSs would soon decline in value.215
These assets were placed on the balance sheet of an offshore shell corporation
via a credit default swap (CDS), and then marketed to investors.  Although
Goldman provided vague and generalized risk factors, it failed to inform in-
vestors that the CDO was specifically designed to remove risky underlying
assets from Goldman’s balance sheet and to produce profits for the firm from
shorting the referenced RMBS assets.  Goldman’s clients ended up losing
nearly $1.7 billion from their investments in Hudson.216
Notably, “Goldman structured the [Hudson] CDO itself, transfer-
ring $1.2 billion of its own risk to investors while telling potential in-
vestors that Hudson was ‘not a balance sheet CDO’ and was ‘sourced
from the Street.’”217  Even more, “Goldman held 100 percent of the
short side of the CDO, meaning that in the event of widespread de-
fault on the referenced assets, the Hudson shell corporation set up by
Goldman as the legal issuer of the securities would stop making pay-
ments to investors and start making payments to Goldman using in-
vestors’ funds” because “[t]he CDO represented a zero-sum
transaction” in which “either Goldman or the investors made money,
but not both.”218  Senator Levin, in describing the transaction, wrote
that “Goldman then marketed and sold this CDO to potential inves-
tors, telling them that it had ‘aligned’ its interests with investors and
mentioning that it held a $6 million equity share while simultane-
ously failing to disclose that it was shorting all $2 billion of Hudson’s
assets.”219
214. “Subprime mortgages” refers to mortgages “to borrowers who had yet to establish
credit histories or had troubled financial histories, sometimes reflecting setbacks
such as unemployment, divorce, medical emergencies, and the like.” FCIC, FINAL
REPORT, supra note 3, at 67.  “Banks might have been unwilling to lend to these
borrowers, but a subprime lender would if the borrower paid a higher interest
rate to offset the extra risk.” Id.  Accordingly, RMBSs and CDOs based on pools
of subprime mortgages, not only filled the need for mortgages to put into credit
derivatives, but also paid higher returns. Id. at 130 (“Investors liked the combi-
nation of apparent safety and strong returns, and investment bankers liked hav-
ing a new source of demand for the lower tranches of mortgage-backed securities
and other asset-backed securities they created.”). See also 156 CONG. REC. S3,155
(daily ed. May 4, 2010) (statement of Sen. Franken) (“As we all know, subprime
mortgages are riskier than regular mortgages.  That is why they are called sub-
prime.  Borrowers are more likely to default.”).
215. Sen. Levin Letter, supra note 184, at 3; see STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra note 8,
at 384–85, 390–92, 517–18.
216. Sen. Levin Letter, supra note 184, at 3; see STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra note 8,
at 518–31.
217. Sen. Levin Letter, supra note 184, at 3; STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at
517–18, 525; see Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap
Participants with Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9766 (Feb. 17, 2012) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 23.431(a)(3)).
218. Sen. Levin Letter, supra note 184, at 4.
219. Id.; STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 525–26, 531.
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Additionally, Senator Levin’s letter stated the following:
The marketing materials contained a section entitled, ‘Certain Conflicts of In-
terest’ that stated that ‘GSI [the Goldman affiliate involved in Hudson] and/or
any of its affiliates may invest and/or deal’ in securities or other interests in
the assets underlying Hudson, and ‘may invest and/or deal’ in CDS contracts
that are ‘linked to’ the Hudson investments.  By the time these materials were
circulated, however, Goldman had already decided to keep 100 percent of
Hudson’s short side.  Thus, the marketing material misrepresented
Goldman’s investment plans, and the extent of Goldman’s adverse interests in
Hudson was not known to the investors that it solicited.  Ultimately, the Hud-
son CDO enabled Goldman to earn a gross profit of $1.7 billion at the direct
expense of its clients.220
Further, as Hudson’s liquidation agent, Goldman promised to liq-
uidate any Hudson asset determined to be a credit risk, but despite
urgent requests from Hudson investors, Goldman delayed liquidating
assets for months, thereby maximizing profits from its short position
while exacerbating the losses to investors.221
2. Anderson
Anderson Mezzanine 2007-1 (Anderson) was a synthetic CDO
referencing BBB and BBB- rated subprime RMBSs that Goldman is-
sued in March 2007.222  Anderson referenced poor quality assets that
another firm selected, subject to Goldman’s approval.223  Goldman
took a short position on approximately 40 percent of the $305 million
in assets underlying Anderson.224  About 45 percent of the underlying
mortgages had been originated by New Century, a longtime Goldman
customer that was, at the time of the deal, “in financial distress.”225
Goldman almost canceled the CDO because the underlying assets
were decreasing in value, but never disclosed that fact to investors.226
Goldman also did not disclose its own internal concerns about the
quality of the mortgages that were the CDO’s reference assets.227
When potential investors asked how Goldman was able to ‘get comfortable’
with the New Century mortgage pools referenced in Anderson, Goldman at-
tempted to dispel concerns about the New Century loans, withheld informa-
tion about its own discomfort with New Century, and withheld that it was
taking 40% of the short side of the CDO, essentially betting against the very
securities it was selling to its clients.228
220. Sen. Levin Letter, supra note 184, at 4, 9; STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at
391, 517, 527.
221. Sen. Levin Letter, supra note 184, at 5; STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at
392, 583–88.
222. STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 392, 532.
223. See id. at 354–55, 392.
224. See id.
225. Id. at 534.
226. Id. at 535–36, 538.
227. Id. at 538.
228. Id. at 541.
2014] REGULATING FAIRNESS 75
3. Timberwolf
Timberwolf I (Timberwolf) was a $1 billion hybrid CDO2 (CDO-
squared)229 transaction that referenced single-A rated securities from
other CDOs, and those securities referenced RMBSs carrying lower
credit ratings.230  Goldman hired another firm to select Timberwolf’s
assets with Goldman’s approval.231  Goldman took a short position on
approximately 36 percent of the $1 billion in assets underlying
Timberwolf.232  The underlying mortgage assets in Timberwolf were
losing value as Goldman was constructing Timberwolf.233  Goldman
made selling Timberwolf securities one of its sales force’s top priori-
ties.234  Goldman sold Timberwolf securities at higher prices than
Goldman knew they were worth, refused to provide pricing methodolo-
gies to investors who requested them, and marked their value down
substantially days or weeks after they were sold.235
Timberwolf was issued in March 2007, when concerns about declining mort-
gage assets caused Goldman to rush Timberwolf to market.  By May 2007,
Goldman believed the value of the assets referenced in Timberwolf had fallen
significantly and conducted an extensive revaluation of that and other CDOs.
The results of this valuation project indicated that the Timberwolf prices
should be dramatically lower.  However, Goldman did not provide notice to
clients, either directly or through the Timberwolf shell corporation, that the
[security-based swaps] underlying Timberwolf had lost significant value.
Rather, Goldman continued to market [Timberwolf security-based swaps] at
inflated prices.236
Troublingly, “[t]hroughout the period in which it sold Timberwolf,
Goldman consistently refused to provide investors with its pricing
methodology, data scenarios, or specific marks for the securities it
marketed.”237  Indeed, Goldman told its sales force that
229. Collateralized Debt Obligation Squared—CDO-Squared, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cdo2.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2014), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/Q2QH-DS22 (“A collateralized debt obligation squared
(CDO-squared) is backed by a pool of collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
tranches. . . .  This is identical to a CDO except for the assets securing the obliga-
tion.  Unlike the CDO, which is backed by a pool of bonds, loans and other credit
instruments; CDO-squared arrangements are backed by CDO tranches.  CDO-
squared allows the banks to resell the credit risk that they have taken in
CDOs.”); see Robert F. Weber, Structural Regulation as Antidote to Complexity
Capture, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 643, 730 (2012) (“At the tail end of the credit bubble,
CDO-squared and CDO-cubed transactions, involving CDOs of CDOs of CDOs,
gained popularity.”).
230. STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 393, 541.
231. Id. at 393.
232. Id. at 393, 541–42.
233. Id. at 543.
234. Id. at 543–44.
235. Sen. Levin Letter, supra note 184, at 6.
236. Id.; STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 393–94, 544–48, 552–54, 557–59.
237. Sen. Levin Letter, supra note 184, at 7.
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under no circumstances are we going to be able to provide materials specific to
Timberwolf . . . or even use the word ‘mark’ in written materials . . . .  Every-
thing will be described in general terms, and if what we provide is too vague
or general, the medium for further clarification must be oral, not written.238
Goldman’s refusal to provide written information concerning its
pricing and valuation methodology frustrated some clients, with
“[i]nvestors often ask[ing] for pricing and valuing information, seeking
additional information to understand the daily marks assigned to
their swap holdings.”239  For example, one investor asked, “How many
times do we have to request data points and scenarios by email. . . .  I
am getting weary of continually hearing about transparency and yet
an obvious avoidance of ‘putting things to paper.’”240
4. Abacus
“Abacus 2007-AC1 (Abacus) was a $2 billion synthetic CDO that
referenced BBB rated mid and subprime RMBS securities issued in
2006 and early 2007.”241  Goldman did not itself invest in Abacus but
earned fees structuring, underwriting, and administering the CDO.242
Goldman originated Abacus 2007-AC1 in response to a request by Paulson &
Co. Inc. (‘Paulson’), a hedge fund that was among Goldman’s largest custom-
ers for subprime mortgage related assets.  Paulson had a very negative view of
the mortgage market, which was publicly known, and wanted Goldman’s as-
sistance in structuring a transaction that would allow it to take a short posi-
tion on a portfolio of subprime mortgage assets that it believed were likely to
perform poorly or fail.  Goldman allowed Paulson to use the Abacus CDO for
that purpose.  In entering into that arrangement with Paulson and simultane-
ously acting as the placement agent responsible for marketing the Abacus se-
curities to long investors, Goldman created a conflict of interest between itself
and the investors it would be soliciting to buy the Abacus securities.243
Goldman knew Paulson’s investment objective, the role that Paul-
son played in the selection of the reference assets, and the fact that
Paulson’s selection process yielded a set of poor quality assets that
were likely to decline in value.244  “Yet Goldman did not publicly dis-
close the central role played by Paulson in the asset selection process
or the fact that the economic interest held by an entity actively in-
volved in the asset selection process was adverse to the interest of in-
vestors would be taking the long position.”245  The Abacus securities—
238. Id.; see STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 509–10.
239. Sen. Levin Letter, supra note 184, at 7.
240. Id.; see STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 559 (internal quotation mark
omitted).
241. STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 395, 560.
242. Id. at 396.
243. Id. at 396, 561–62.
244. Id. at 377, 396, 564–67.
245. Id. at 396, 564–65.  Paulson had a strong influence on the selection of assets, with
an eye toward selecting mortgage assets that would perform poorly. Id. at
566–67.
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which are worthless today—lost their value soon after purchase, with
the three long investors together losing more than $1 billion, while
Paulson, the sole short investor, receiving about $1 billion in prof-
its.246  On April 16, 2010, the SEC filed a complaint against Goldman
and one of the lead salespeople for the Abacus CDO, Fabrice Tourre,
alleging they had failed to disclose materially adverse information to
potential investors and thereby committed securities fraud.247  On
July 14, 2010, Goldman reached a settlement with the SEC in which
Goldman admitted that the “marketing materials” “contained incom-
plete information” and agreed to pay a $550 million fine.248  Mr.
Tourre did not settle with the SEC, and he ultimately lost at trial on
August 1, 2013, with a jury finding that he had misled investors in
connection with the Abacus CDO.249
V. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF GOOD FAITH PRINCIPLES FOR
THE FAIR DEALING RULE
A. Contract Law’s Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing
Principles of good faith have been—and continue to be—invoked in
many different areas of the law, such as statutes250 and in decisional
246. Id. at 396–97, 573–74.
247. Id. at 397.
248. Id.  “[I]t is clear that the Abacus marketing material and offering documents pro-
vided by Goldman to investors contained no mention of Paulson’s short position
in the CDO nor the significant role it played in the selection of the CDO’s refer-
ence assets.” Id. at 571.  “Still another troubling omission was Goldman’s failure
to advise potential Abacus investors that the firm’s own economic interests were
aligned with those of the Paulson hedge fund.” Id.
249. Susanne Craig & Ben Protess, Former Trader Is Found Liable In Fraud Case,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2013, 3:36 PM), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/5AJC-
8WBL (“A federal jury found the trader, Fabrice Tourre, liable on six counts of
civil securities fraud after a three-week trial in Lower Manhattan. . . .  The
S.E.C.’s case against Mr. Tourre hinged on the contention that he and Goldman
sold investors a mortgage security in 2007 without disclosing a crucial conflict of
interest: a hedge fund that helped construct the deal, Paulson & Company, also
bet that it would fail.”); Justin Baer, Tourre Verdict Could Prolong Goldman’s
Pain, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000
1424127887323420604578647971040860936, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
P986-AFRT (“A federal jury found Mr. Tourre liable on Thursday for six of the
government’s claims that he misled investors in a complex credit instrument
called Abacus 2007-AC1.  Among the jury’s findings:  Mr. Tourre, a former trader
who had helped create Abacus, aided and abetted Goldman in violating securities
laws.”).
250. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 260 (2012) (according to the Fair Labor Standards Act, an
employer who violates the federal overtime provisions is liable for liquidated
damages equal to one hundred percent of the amount of compensatory damages
where the employer’s actions were not taken in good faith); 5
U.S.C. § 563(a)(3)(B) (2012) (stating that an agency may engage in a negotiated
rulemaking via committee if there is a reasonable likelihood that a committee
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law.251  Accordingly, the CFTC (or federal courts) could, when inter-
preting Regulation 23.433, draw principles of good faith and fair deal-
ing from other areas of the law as a way to further delineate, inter
alia, what constitutes violations of the duty of swap entities to com-
municate fairly with counterparties.  Contract law appears to be a
strong candidate from which one could borrow principles of good faith
and fair dealing.  After all, swap agreements and other derivatives are
contracts, so contract law would seem like a natural source for good
faith principles to better define Regulation 23.433’s duty to communi-
cate fairly with counterparties.  Indeed, in the External Business Con-
duct Standards adopting release, the CFTC looked to the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts in connection with what constitutes an “of-
fer,”252 which shows that contract law principles are valid sources of
law for swap contracts.  Further, contract law’s implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing has been analyzed by numerous judicial
decisions253 and law review articles254 from which courts—and even
the CFTC—could import principles of good faith and fair dealing to
use in interpreting the duty that Regulation 23.433 imposes on swap
entities.
According to one scholar, contract law largely has been under-uti-
lized in analyzing issues related to the financial crisis, even though
“[a]t the bottom of the financial crisis lie failed contracts[,]” and
could be convened with a balanced representation of persons who will be signifi-
cantly affected by the rule and who are willing to negotiate in good faith to reach
a consensus on it);  2 U.S.C. § 438(e) (2012) (stating that “any person who relies
upon any rule or regulation prescribed by the [Federal Election Commission] in
accordance with the provisions of this section and who acts in good faith in accor-
dance with such rule or regulation shall not, as a result of such act, be subject to
any sanction . . . .”).
251. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683 (1963) (contract law);
Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit-Man Corp., 377 Pa. 549, 556 (1954) (contract law);
Ball v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 221 P.3d 717 (Okla. 2009) (tort law); Universe Life Ins.
Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 50–51 (Tex. 1997) (tort law); Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 58 (2006) (employment discrimination).
252. See Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants
with Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9741 (Feb. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 23.400).
253. See Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968) (catalogu-
ing and analyzing different contract law cases invoking good faith).
254. See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63
YALE L.J. 1057 (1954); Eric M. Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good
Faith: Good Faith Disclosure in Contract Formation, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 381
(1978); Monique C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdictions in Search of a Standard: The Cove-
nant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in the Employment Context, 57 MO. L. REV.
1233 (1992).  For a more exhaustive list, see Harold Dubroff, The Implied Cove-
nant of Good Faith in Contract Interpretation and Gap-Filling: Reviling a Re-
vered Relic, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 559, 560–61 n.4 (2006).
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“[f]ailed contracts are the stuff of contract law.”255  Professor George
M. Cohen of the University of Virginia School of Law has noted that,
even though the financial crisis involved failed contracts, “to date,
most discussions of possible responses to the financial crisis ignore
contract law.”256  Admittedly, Professor Cohen’s comments were in
connection with an article focusing on “the contract at the root of the
crisis, the residential home mortgage loan[,]”257 and not swap con-
tracts.  But Professor Cohen’s general point—that scholars analyzing
issues related to the financial crisis largely have overlooked poten-
tially viable contract-law theories to resolve lingering questions—may
have merit.  Perhaps the CFTC could look to contract law jurispru-
dence for guidance in determining the fair dealing rule’s scope.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been called
“a fundamental concept of modern contract jurisprudence.”258  Section
205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that “[e]very con-
tract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code] imposes an obli-
gation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.”259  The
Uniform Commercial Code imposes an obligation of good faith in per-
formance and enforcement on every contract that falls within its am-
bit,260 and it defines good faith as “honesty in fact and the observance
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”261  Further, most
U.S. jurisdictions have recognized the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in their decisional law.262
Some attribute the origin of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing to New York state jurisprudence in the early Twentieth
Century.  For example, in 1903, the New York Court of Appeals stated
that “[t]he obligation of good faith and fair dealing towards each other
is implied in every contract of this character.”263 And in 1914, the
Court of Appeals stated that “the obligation of good faith in carrying
255. George M. Cohen, The Financial Crisis and the Forgotten Law of Contracts, 87
TUL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 4.
258. Dubroff, supra note 254, at 559.
259. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
260. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2003).
261. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (2003).  Every state except Louisiana has adopted the Uni-
form Commercial Code.  Emily M.S. Houh, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Con-
tract Law:  A (Nearly) Empty Vessel?, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1 (2005) (citing David
V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 379 (2003)).
262. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 369 (1980).
263. New York Central Ironworks Co. v. United States Radiator Co., 174 N.Y. 331, 335
(1903); see Dubroff, supra note 254, at 569–70 (discussing the New York Central
Ironworks decision).
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out what is written” was “a contractual obligation of universal
force[.]”264   In 1933, the Court of Appeals further stated:265
[I]n every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do
anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the
other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every
contract there exists and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
In describing the implied covenant, Section 205 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts states as follows:
Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in performance
even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified.  But the obligation
goes further: bad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and fair deal-
ing may require more than honesty.  A complete catalogue of types of bad faith
is impossible, but the following types are among those which have been recog-
nized in judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit the bargain, lack of diligence
and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of power to
specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party’s
performance.266
Therefore, contract law has a robust history of good faith jurispru-
dence that appears broad enough to handle a variety of factual
circumstances.
B. Drawbacks to Using Contract Law Principles of Good
Faith
Unfortunately, analysis of contract law’s implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing reveals that it is unsuitable for supplying princi-
ples on which to base violations of the CFTC’s fair dealing rule.  First,
good faith in contract law frequently is used for “gap filling” in con-
tracts that are silent on a particular issue and not for civil enforce-
ment actions targeting wrongdoing.267  As such, decisions invoking
good faith as a contract gap filler would involve extremely different
circumstances than situations involving enforcement actions by a fi-
nancial regulator civilly prosecuting improper communications by
swap entities.  Second, the predominate view is that the implied cove-
nant only applies to the performance and enforcement of contracts, and
264. Brassil v. Md. Gas Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 241 (1914).
265. Dubroff, supra note 254, at 565 (citing Kirk La Shell v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263
N.Y 79 (1933)).
266. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 205, cmt. d (1981).
267. Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition and Con-
ceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 812 (1982) (stating that the implied cove-
nant of good faith “is a kind of ‘safety valve’ to which judges may turn to fill gaps
and qualify or limit rights and duties otherwise arising under rules of law and
specific contract language”).  One noted legal commentator even suggested that
the only role of good faith is to “imply[ ] terms in the agreement.”  E. Allan Farns-
worth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 670 (1963).
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not their negotiation or other pre-contractual communications,268
whereas the CFTC’s fair dealing rule covers all communications con-
cerning a swap, “including communications made prior to an offer.”269
This issue is critical, because one of the main purposes of the Regula-
tion 23.433 is to police sales communications of swap entities,270 and
such communications include pre-contractual discussions, such as
sales pitches, and the negotiation of the terms of swap agreements.
Therefore, jurisprudence concerning contract law’s implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing likely would be of limited utility for the
fair dealing rule, given that contract law’s implied covenant does not
address pre-contractual sales pitches and related communications,
which are of primary importance to Regulation 23.433.
Lastly, the exact contours of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing vary by jurisdiction, with a majority of jurisdictions read-
ing the doctrine in a “restrictive fashion,”271 with some jurisdictions
holding that “[t]here is no general implied covenant of good faith” and
others stating that “[t]he obligation does not exist under every con-
tract . . . .”272  Under such circumstances, with jurisdictions differing
in their views as to the scope and applicability of the implied covenant
and many jurisdictions limiting the breadth of the doctrine, importing
principles of good faith and fair dealing from contract law would not
provide greater clarity as to the obligations imposed by the CFTC’s
fair dealing rule.  Even more, adopting a narrow and restrictive view
of good faith from contract law would run counter to the intention of
Congress, which included the fair dealing mandate in CEA Section
4s(h) and thereby explicitly directed the CFTC to require swap enti-
ties to improve their behavior when communicating with
counterparties.
While the content of contract law jurisprudence in connection with
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing appears to be a
poor source of law for the fair dealing rule, perhaps one contract law
conceptual approach to good faith is worth borrowing for purposes of
better defining the scope of Regulation 23.433’s prohibition on unfair
268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. c (1981) (“Bad faith in negotiation,
although not within the scope of this Section, may be subject to sanctions.  Partic-
ular forms of bad faith in bargaining are the subjects of rules as to capacity to
contract, mutual assent and consideration and of rules as to invalidating causes
such as fraud and duress.”); Houh, supra note 261, at 3–4 (observing that the
implied covenant “fails to reach the most troubling forms of contractual bad faith:
those that occur during contract negotiation and formation”).
269. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9741 (Feb. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 23.400).
270. See id. at 9769–70.
271. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Implied Obligation of Good Faith in Contract Law:
Is It Time to Write Its Obituary?, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009).
272. Id. at 10.
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and unbalanced communications.  In particular, Emeritus Professor
Robert S. Summers of Cornell Law School, developed an “excluder”
conceptualization of good faith273 that could provide greater specific-
ity concerning the kinds of communications that violate Regulation
23.433.
C. The “Excluder” Conceptualization of Good Faith as a
Possible Model Framework for the Fair Dealing Rule
Rather than affirmatively say what good faith is, one could alter-
natively define good faith by developing a list of concrete examples of
what it is not.  In this manner, the notoriously ambiguous concept of
good faith could become more clear through illustrations of its oppo-
site.  Such is the approach to good faith taken by Section 205 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, adopted by the American Law In-
stitute in 1979 and published in final form in 1981.274  Section 205 of
the Restatement adopted the “excluder conceptualization” framework
for good faith that was first advocated by Professor Summers in a
1968 Virginia Law Review article.275  Professor Summers stated that
“good faith is an ‘excluder’ . . . [in that i]t is a phrase without general
meaning (or meanings) of its own and serves to exclude a wide range
of heterogeneous forms of bad faith.”276  Professor Summers stated
that, “[i]n a particular context the phrase takes on specific meaning,
but usually this is only by way of contrast with the specific form of bad
faith actually or hypothetically ruled out.”277   Put simply, Professor
Summers believed that one could most easily understand good faith by
reference to concrete examples of bad faith behaviors.278  In adopting
an excluder conceptualization of good faith, “Section 205 [of Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts] is an unusually ‘circumstance-bound’ re-
quirement, and excludes highly varied forms of bad faith, many of
273. Summers, supra note 253, at 195.
274. Summers, supra note 267, at 810–11, 825.  “[G]ood faith is conceptualized in sec-
tion 205 as an excluder—having no general, positive, content of its own—which
functions to rule out a wide variety of forms of bad faith.” Id. at 827.
275. See id. at 820; Houh, supra note 261, at 2 (“In 1981, the American Law Institute
adopted Summers’s approach at section 205 of the Restatement and in the text of
its Official Comments section.”).  The Article that influenced the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts is Summers, supra note 253, at 195.
276. Summers, supra note 253, at 201; see Summers, supra note 267, at 819.
277. Summers, supra note 253, at 201.
278. See Summers, supra note 267, at 818.  Professor Summers stated that his “con-
ceptualization” of good faith as an “excluder” derived from the work of the philos-
opher J.L. Austin of Oxford University. Id. at 818–19.  “To paraphrase J.L.
Austin, the attempt to capture in a set of normally necessary and sufficient condi-
tions some characteristic or characteristics common to all things that are or could
be called ‘good faith’ is doomed to failure.” Id. at 828.
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which become identifiable only in the context of circumstantial detail
of a kind that defies comprehensive formulation in a single rule.”279
Using an excluder concept of good faith, Professor Summers main-
tained that one could create a list of specific examples of prohibited
bad faith and thereby develop a better understanding of its opposite,
good faith.280  For example, Professor Summers stated that “[t]he be-
ginnings of such a list might look like this:”281
Form of Bad Faith Conduct Meaning of Good Faith
1. Seller concealing a defect in fully disclosing material facts
what he is selling
2. Builder willfully failing to substantially performing without
perform in full, though knowingly deviating from
otherwise substantial specifications
performing
3. Contractor openly abusing refraining from abusing bargaining
bargaining power to coerce an power
increase in the contract price
4. Hiring a broker and then acting cooperatively
deliberately preventing him
from consummating the deal
5. Conscious lack of diligence in acting diligently
mitigating the other party’s
damages
6. Arbitrarily and capriciously acting with some reason
exercising a power to terminate
a contract
7. Adopting an overreaching interpreting contract language fairly
interpretation of contract
language
8. Harassing the other party for accepting adequate assurances282
repeated assurances of
performance
Professor Summers’ excluder conceptualization of good faith has
been criticized.  Indeed, the belief that one cannot define good faith
except by reference to bad faith, which itself cannot be defined except
by way of specific examples, does not exactly remove vagueness or am-
279. Id. at 821.
280. Summers, supra note 253, at 202 (“Good faith, then, takes on specific and variant
meanings by way of contrast with the specific and variant forms of bad faith
which judges decide to prohibit.”).
281. Id. at 202–03.
282. This list is taken verbatim from Summers, supra note 253, at 203.
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biguity from the concept of good faith.283  But there is strength in Pro-
fessor Summers’s argument that attempts to find a single, all-purpose
meaning of “good faith” (for example, one suggestion was to define
good faith as the “absence of intention to harm a legally protected pe-
cuniary interest”) generally result in “very little, if any, genuine defi-
nitional guidance.”284  All too often, attempts to define broad terms
such as “good faith” are ambiguous and unhelpful,285 whereas specific
examples of violative conduct at least can delineate the contours of
good faith like stakes in the ground marking a parcel of land’s
boundaries.
D. Applying an Excluder Conceptualization to Regulation
23.433
In any event, even if one were to disagree with the use of an ex-
cluder conceptualization of good faith for purposes of contract law, it
does not necessarily follow that an excluder conceptualization would
be inappropriate for the purposes of providing guidance in connection
with Regulation 23.433.  Indeed, an excluder conceptualization seems
particularly appropriate for an open-ended principle such as the
CFTC’s fair dealing rule.  Based on the External Business Conduct
Standards adopting release, NFA guidance and the Senate Report
contain examples of unfair and unbalanced communications that
would violate Regulation 23.433.  Using an excluder conceptualiza-
tion, the CFTC could create a list of the specific kinds of communica-
tions that are unfair and unbalanced in violation of derivatives
industry principles of good faith and fair dealing, and that list would
serve to illustrate not only what kind of communications violate Regu-
lation 23.433, but also what kind of communications are fair and bal-
anced.  In short, one would define fair and balanced communications
by their opposite through concrete examples of unfair and unbalanced
communications taken from NFA guidance and the Senate Report.
However, while an excluder framework likely would provide greater
clarity concerning the kinds of communications that the fair dealing
rule prohibits, it should not be the only method used to do so.  After
all, the adopting release states that Regulation 23.433 incorporates
concepts of fairness from NFA rules and notices, and those rules and
notices have positive, affirmative definitions and meanings, which is
an approach that is contrary to an excluder conceptualization.  The
CFTC should not disregard the years of thought and development that
went into the NFA rules and related guidance that affirmatively de-
fine industry obligations to behave ethically and communicate fairly,
283. Dubroff, supra note 254, at 594.
284. Summers, supra note 267, at 829 (citation omitted).
285. For example, the maxim, “Fairness is what justice really is,” is unhelpful in defin-
ing either fairness or justice.
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but an excluder conceptualization could provide an additional frame-
work through which one could organize and present NFA guidance in
connection with the CFTC’s fair dealing rule.
Accordingly, if Regulation 23.433 has the same scope as the NFA
guidance cited by the CFTC in the proposing and adopting releases
(i.e., focusing on the NFA customer communications rule and related
interpretive notices), and if it also serves to prohibit the improper con-
duct outlined in the Senate Report, then the fair dealing rule likely
prohibits communications that:286
(1) State that trading swaps is appropriate for all persons;287
(2) Fail to balance the potential opportunities or advantages
presented by a swap with statements of corresponding risks
(e.g., by discussing potential profits more frequently, or in a
larger font size, than discussions of possible risks);288
(3) Refer to actual past trading profits without mentioning that
past results are not necessarily indicative of future results;289
(4) Fail to disclose the costs (i.e., fees and charges) of trading
when introducing an account;290
(5) Include statements of opinion that are not disclosed as
such;291
(6) Include statements of opinion that do not have a reasonable
basis in fact;292
(7) Use hypothetical performance results in a manner that con-
flicts with NFA or CFTC rules (e.g., without required dis-
claimers, etc.);293
(8) Involve high-pressure sales practices, which, generally speak-
ing, are tactics that pressure prospective customers to make
286. This list has been compiled without regard to whether a communication is “rou-
tine” or contained in “promotional material,” as that distinction is not found in
the CEA or in CFTC Regulations.  Additionally, some of the examples below also
likely constitute fraud, which means that they also would violate antifraud provi-
sions in the CEA and CFTC Regulations.
287. See Interpretive Notice 9003, supra note 109.
288. See Rule 2-29. Communications with the Public and Promotional Material, supra
note 114, at (a)(3); Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major
Swap Participants with Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9769 (Feb. 17, 2012)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 23.433).
289. Rule 2-29. Communications with the Public and Promotional Material, supra
note 114, at (a)(3).
290. Rule 2-4. Just and Equitable Principles of Trade, supra note 116; Interpretive
Notice 9005, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/
NFAManual.aspx#5 (last visited Feb. 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
4PV2-XNF9.
291. Rule 2-29. Communications with the Public and Promotional Material, supra
note 114, at (d).
292. Id.
293. Interpretive Notice 9025, supra note 152.
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hasty decisions, i.e., to act now and think later by, inter alia,
barraging customers with repeated telephone calls at unusual
times or by berating or bullying customers;294
(9) Rely on isolated trades in specific customer accounts (i.e.,
cherry-picked trades) to claim that other customers have
made dramatic profits;295
(10) State that tremendous profits would result from projected
price movements that are characterized as conservative esti-
mates, when in fact such price movements would be
dramatic;296
(11) Use price data for a financial product different from the one
being marketed;297
(12) Imply that customers are likely to make substantial profits by
following recommendations that are purported to be based on,
inter alia, factors such as seasonal data that supposedly
shows that certain trades produce dramatic profits year in
and year out, or historic price moves that are predicted as be-
ing likely to occur again;298
(13) Fail to provide a sound basis for evaluating the facts with re-
spect to swaps by, inter alia, refusing to provide prospective
counterparties with pricing methodology, data scenarios, or
specific marks;299
(14) Use outdated information to support current claims;300
(15) Make claims regarding research or other facilities beyond
those which the person making the claims actually possesses
or can provide;301
(16) State that a report, analysis or other service will be furnished
free unless such report, analysis, or service actually will be
furnished free and without condition or obligation;302
(17) Use projected performance results that do not have a reasona-
ble basis in fact;303
(18) Fail to identify all of the material assumptions associated
with projected performance results;304
294. Interpretive Notice 9038, supra note 161.
295. Interpretive Notice 9039, supra note 168.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 509–10.
300. Interpretive Notice 9043, supra note 174.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
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(19) Refer to projected performance results without a discussion of
the risks to balance the reference to projected profits;305
(20) Refer to past performance results without indicating the gen-
eral market conditions during the period covered;306
(21) Market, promote, or sell a swap without disclosing any of the
following:
i. Material adverse incentives or conflicts of interests, such
as the receipt of any form of payment in connection with
a swap in addition to the amount paid by the
counterparty;307
ii. Information concerning the price of the swap, including
the methodology used to determine that price;308
iii. One’s expectation that the swap in question would per-
form poorly or fail;309
iv. One’s knowledge that the overall market for these kinds
of swaps was deteriorating;310
v. The fact that the swap was structured or designed to per-
form poorly or fail.311
The above list is just one example of how an excluder conceptual-
ization could provide greater clarity to Regulation 23.433’s prohibi-
tions.  Use of an excluder conceptualization would involve creating a
list of short examples, with each example describing communications
that violate the CFTC’s fair dealing rule.  Here, the one-sentence ex-
amples come from the Senate Report and selected NFA guidance, but
one could pull additional examples from, inter alia, decisions by the
NFA’s Business Conduct Committee invoking relevant Compliance
Rules or federal court decisions on the CEA’s antifraud provisions.
Thus, under an excluder conceptualization, one would define commu-
nications that are fair and balanced based on principles of good faith
and fair dealing by their opposite—unfair and unbalanced communi-
cations that violate principles of good faith and fair dealing—as illus-
trated by concrete examples.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress directed the CFTC to promulgate a rule to ensure that
swap entities communicated in a fair and balanced manner based on
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 391, 525–26, 541; Business Conduct
Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with Counterparties,
77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9769–70 (Feb. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 23.433).
308. See STAFF, SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 509–10.
309. See id. at 384–85, 396, 517–18, 564–67.
310. See id. at 319, 330–31.
311. See id. at 396, 561–62.
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principles of good faith and fair dealing.  The CFTC, in adopting Regu-
lation 23.433, stated that its fair dealing rule would incorporate fu-
tures industry principles of good faith and fair dealing as embodied in
NFA guidance.  The CFTC further stated that its fair dealing rule
would serve to prohibit the kind of conduct that, as documented in the
Senate Report, swap dealers perpetrated in the years leading up to
the financial crisis.  But despite those efforts to clarify what would be
covered by the fair dealing rule, many ambiguities remained.
In an attempt to provide greater clarity to the CFTC’s fair dealing
rule, this Article analyzed NFA guidance, the Senate Report, and, in
seeking alternative sources of good faith principles, contract law doc-
trines related to good faith.  Analysis of NFA guidance revealed that
industry principles of good faith and fair dealing prohibit, among
other things, high-pressure sales practices and communications that
do not balance mention of potential benefits of a trading strategy with
an accompanying discussion of the risks.  Further, in a departure from
the CEA and CFTC Regulations, NFA Compliance Rule 2-29(b) pro-
hibits negligent misrepresentations contained in promotional mate-
rial, which is defined broadly to include many kinds of
communications, from emails to advertisements.  Compliance Rule 2-
29(b) also appears to place the burden on the defendant to show the
accuracy or reasonableness of statements that, among other things,
purport to reference prior or projected trading performance results.
Additionally, an examination of the improper conduct by swap dealers
and their salespeople as described in the Senate Report reveals that
the CFTC envisions Regulation 23.433 as prescribing failures to dis-
close material incentives and conflicts of interest on the part of swap
dealers, as well as failures to disclose information relating to the
source of underlying swap assets and the purposes for which swaps
were created and structured.
Undoubtedly, with time, the CFTC, the NFA, and the federal
courts are likely, either through decisions on cases or via additional
guidance, to provide more information concerning the principles of
good faith and fair dealing for swap entities.  In the meantime, pursu-
ant to an excluder conceptualization of good faith, fact patterns
describing the specific kinds of abusive and unfair communications
identified in NFA guidance and in the Senate Report can serve as
guideposts indicating what swap entity salespeople should not do
when interacting with counterparties, lest they risk running afoul of
the CFTC’s fair dealing rule.  In this manner, Regulation 23.433 can
serve an important regulatory function by complimenting other busi-
ness conduct standards and existing prohibitions on improper or un-
ethical behavior by swap entities.
